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DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE:  
A DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT IN CHILD WELFARE 
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET* 
ABSTRACT 
 Differential Response represents the most important child welfare initiative of the day, 
with Differential Response programs rapidly expanding throughout the country. It is de-
signed to radically change our child welfare system, diverting the great majority of Child 
Protective Services cases to an entirely voluntary system. This Article describes the serious 
risks Differential Response poses for children and the flawed research being used to promote 
it as “evidence based.” It puts the Differential Response movement in historical context as 
one of a series of extreme family preservation movements supported by a corrupt merger of 
advocacy with research. It argues for reform that would honor children’s rights, confront the 
problems of poverty underlying child maltreatment in a serious way, and expand rather 
than reduce the capacity of Child Protective Services to address child maltreatment. It calls 
for a change in the dynamics of child welfare research and policy so that we can avoid end-
lessly repeating history in ways harmful to child interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 A powerful coalition of forces is pushing our nation’s child welfare 
system toward a “reform” they generally call Differential Response 
(DR). The idea is to divert the vast majority of cases now dealt with 
by child protective services (CPS) to an entirely voluntary system 
that leaves parents free to refuse to participate without fear of any 
consequence. 
 Other names for DR systems include Alternative Response (AR), 
Family Assessment Response, Dual-Track, Multi-Track, or Multiple-
Response Systems, and in an earlier era, Community Partnership.1 
DR is often used to refer to the overall system that includes two 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. I discuss Community Partnerships in my 1999 book, Nobody’s Children. 
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN 146-54 (1999). DR was first implemented in 
Missouri and Florida between 1993 and 1995. Alan Puckett, Casey Family Programs, 
Differential Response: Review and Summary of Research Evidence, UNIV. OF COLO. DENVER 
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/ 
pediatrics/subs/can/DR/Documents/Conference%202013%20Handouts/Friday/DR%20Review 
%20and%20Summary%20of%20Research%20Evidence.pdf (last visited July 20, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/7D8W-F2GJ. 
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tracks—one, the new AR Track, and the other, the traditional CPS 
track.2 Some systems have a third track for cases which would nor-
mally be screened out by CPS based on a conclusion that there is no 
apparent need for CPS intervention to protect children.3 I will use DR 
to refer to the overall system and will use AR and Traditional Re-
sponse (TR) to refer to the two tracks used for cases that normally 
would be screened in by CPS.  
 DR constitutes the latest fad in extreme forms of family preserva-
tion promoted over recent decades.4 It is expanding rapidly through-
out the country.5 One comprehensive analysis of DR notes that the 
“development of a national advocacy team and access to significant 
federal and foundation resources” make DR “one of the more widely 
replicated child welfare reform efforts in recent history.”6 An im-
portant 2014 Report summarizing recent research indicates that DR 
has already been implemented in a majority of states.7 The federal 
                                                                                                                                       
 2. For DR history, descriptions, and definitions, see generally INST. OF MED. & NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT RESEARCH 198-99, 
203-04 (Anne C. Peterson et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter IOM/NRC 2014 REPORT], available 
at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2013/New-Directions-in-Child-Abuse-and-Neglect-Research. 
aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/8DSZ-FR79; TAMARA FULLER ET AL., DIFFERENTIAL 
RESPONSE IN ILLINOIS: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 6-10 (2013) [hereinafter FULLER ET AL., 
FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT], available at http://cfrc.illinois.edu/pubs/rp_20140205_ 
DifferentialResponseInIllinoisFinalEvaluationReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PA8K-
QHRJ; LISA MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., NATIONAL QUALITY IMPROVEMENT CENTER ON 
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES, FINAL REPORT: QIC-DR CROSS-
SITE EVALUATION 5-23 (2014), available at http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/ 
colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/subs/can/QIC-DR/Documents/Final%20Cross 
%20Site%20Evaluation%20Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H8U5-7FNW; Tamara 
L. Fuller et al., Differential Response Family Assessments: Listening to What Parents Say 
About Service Helpfulness, 39 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 7, 7-8 (2015).  
 3. See STEVE OLSON & CLARE STROUD, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
CHILD MALTREATMENT RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE FOR THE NEXT DECADE 84 (2012), 
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13368, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
FXC8-EQPR. 
 4. See generally BARTHOLET, supra note 1, for a critique of the child welfare system’s 
excessive bias for family preservation at the expense of children’s interests. 
 5. See KRISTIN ABNER & RACHEL A. GORDON, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: A FAMILY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS 6 (2012), http://www.familyimpactseminars.org/fia_analyses_drfia.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8W6B-MSQB. A major push was provided by the Harvard 
Executive Sessions of New Paradigms for Child Protection between 1994 and 1997, funded 
by the Annie E. Casey and Edna McConnell Clark Foundations. Id. at 5. Missouri subse-
quently established a DR system which became a model for other states, and by late 2010, 
twenty-one states had implemented DR in at least some part of their systems. JOANNE 
RUPPEL ET AL., DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN NEW YORK 
STATE: IMPLEMENTATION, INITIAL OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS OF PILOT PROJECT 5-6 (2011), 
available at http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/reports/CPS%20Differential%20Response 
%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report_%20Jan%202011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
33XM-8HL3.  
 6. Ronald C. Hughes et al., Issues in Differential Response, 23 RES. ON SOC. WORK 
PRAC. 493, 494 (2013).  
 7. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 17-18 fig. 2.1; see also IOM/NRC 2014 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 199; KAI GUTERMAN ET AL., CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE 
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government gave DR a boost in 2010 by reauthorizing the Child 
Abuse and Prevention Treatment Act (CAPTA)8 with language re-
quiring states to include “differential response in triage procedures 
for the appropriate referral of a child not at risk of imminent harm to 
a community organization or voluntary preventive service.”9 
 The wealthy and powerful Casey Family Programs has combined 
with the American Humane Association, the Institute of Applied Re-
search (IAR), and the Kempe Center for the Prevention and Treat-
ment of Child Abuse and Neglect, to promote DR, provide technical 
assistance in implementing DR, and design and implement the re-
search used to claim that DR is an evidence-based success story.10  
 Casey Family Programs has played a central role. Its policy team 
maintains a major presence on Capitol Hill, in state governments, 
and in major child welfare policy forums around the country.11 Ca-
sey’s financial and human resources provide a unique ability to influ-
ence policy.12 It has supported DR in a major way since 2003 when it 
                                                                                                                                       
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE (DR) IMPLEMENTATION RESOURCE KIT: A RESOURCE FOR 
JURISDICTIONS CONSIDERING OR PLANNING FOR DR 6 (2014) (stating that DR exists in 
relatively pure form in twenty-two states, with similar system reforms operational in eight 
additional states, and another twelve states  currently considering or planning DR imple-
mentation); OLSON & STROUD, supra note 3, at 84; Daniel Heimpel, Differential Response 
Dealt Heavy Blow, THE CHRONICLE OF SOC. CHANGE (June 24, 2014), 
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/analysis/differential-response-dealt-heavy-blow-2/7289, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DR7Z-2J77 (noting that DR has spread to as many as thirty 
states). By 2009, the percentage of screened-in child maltreatment reports referred to DR 
reached roughly 9%. ABNER & GORDON, supra note 5, at 16 fig. 1. 
 8. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-320, 124 Stat. 3459 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(v) (2012)). 
 9. John D. Fluke et al., Thinking Differentially: A Response to Issues in Differential 
Response, 23 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 545, 546 (2013). 
 10. See, e.g., MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5; see also infra Parts IV, 
IV.B.1 IV.B.4, V.C. The Casey Family Programs DR Implementation Kit referred to supra 
note 7 is designed to persuade and enable new jurisdictions to adopt DR, providing them a 
positive slant on the evidence regarding DR along with information as to how other juris-
dictions have implemented DR. This Kit documents some of the special funding and tech-
nical assistance provided to DR programs by  Casey Family Programs, Casey cousin the 
Marguerite Casey Foundation, IAR, and organizations involved in the QIC-DR, as dis-
cussed infra Part IV.B.1, 4 below, including the Kempe Center. See, e.g., GUTERMAN ET AL., 
supra note 7, at 57, 59, 62.  
 11. Memorandum from Sean Hughes on Differential Response, Racial Disproportion-
ality, and Fed. Fin. Reform: Casey Family Programs and the Movement to End Foster Care 
in America, to author and Daniel Heimpel, Founder and Director, Fostering Media Connec-
tions 3 (Aug. 28, 2013) (on file with the author). This research memorandum was written 
for Elizabeth Bartholet and Daniel Heimpel based on research in spring and summer 2013. 
Together with Daniel Heimpel of Fostering Media Connections and with the aid of several 
research and investigation fellows, I have been investigating since June 2013 DR policy 
and research as well as related issues involving the current state of the Racial Dispropor-
tionality movement. 
 12. Id.  
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sponsored a Breakthrough Series Collaborative on DR13 and “formed 
a partnership with [California counties] . . . to develop, test, and 
begin implementing differential response . . . .”14  
One observer sums up:  
Perhaps the most important common thread has been the extent to 
which Casey Family Programs has been the primary proponent 
and funder of [the DR and related finance reform movement along 
with other family preservation efforts]. . . . Notably, [these] move-
ments possess at their core a commitment to reducing out-of-home 
care placements. This supports Casey’s 2020 goal of reducing fos-
ter care caseloads by half, and helps explain why Casey has in-
vested so heavily . . . .15 
 This kind of family preservation movement has enormous power 
to shape the child welfare system. It is designed to change the way 
CPS systems use their broad discretionary power to decide whether 
or not to intervene in families to protect children against parental 
abuse and neglect. It may or may not be translated into formal law 
requiring CPS systems to implement DR. But regardless, it operates 
effectively as law, changing the nature of our child protection sys-
tems. As such, it constitutes an end run around legislation like the 
federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), which was 
designed to reduce family preservation bias and make child safety 
and well-being a higher priority.16 So, for example, ASFA tells state 
CPS systems and courts that children must be removed from parents 
found responsible for certain forms of dangerous child maltreatment, 
but those ASFA requirements are inapplicable if CPS never inter-
venes to make such findings.  
 The DR movement promotes two inter-related ideas. First is to 
divert the vast majority of cases now on the CPS track to a purely 
voluntary, “family-friendly” track.17 “Family” means parents, because 
the basic idea is to be friendly to parents accused of maltreating chil-
                                                                                                                                       
 13. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, IMPLEMENTING DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN 
CALIFORNIA: PROMISING PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED vi (2007), available at 
http://www.cfpic.org/pdfs/BSCDifferentialResponseCA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
7SNT-H777.  
 14. Id.; see also Heimpel, supra note 7 (“Casey Family Programs . . . has poured mon-
ey into DR expansion from California to Illinois.”). 
 15. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 65; see also Daniel Heimpel, 
‘Alternative Response’ Is No Solution to Child Abuse [Commentary], BALT. SUN (July 17, 
2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-07-17/news/bs-ed-alternative-response-2014 
0717_1_child-abuse-neglect-child-welfare, archived at http://perma.cc/HF7E-L3X7 (noting 
Casey Family Programs’ lobbying strength and its substantial investments in reducing 
foster care placements). See generally Part IV for Casey Family Programs’ role in DR.  
 16. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2000)); see also BARTHOLET, supra note 
1, at 188-89 (discussing the ASFA).  
 17. See discussion infra Part II.A.  
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dren. Under DR  parents are to be free from intervention by CPS, 
intervention which can take the form of monitoring to ensure child 
safety at home, requirements to cooperate in rehabilitative treat-
ment, removal of children to foster care as needed for their protec-
tion, and in the most extreme cases, termination of parental rights 
and placement of children in adoption. DR advocates say that their 
friendly approach will serve children better than the CPS system 
because it will more likely engage parents, and they point out that 
the CPS system fails to provide most of the families on its caseload 
with any helpful services. They also argue that when CPS uses its 
power to remove children to foster care, it often does more harm 
than good.18  
 The second idea is to finance the DR system with funds diverted 
from the traditional CPS system.19 Those promoting DR are pushing 
for what they call child welfare finance reform. The major focus is on 
changing the federal finance structure so as to shift federal funds 
now going to support foster care to the new DR system. In addition, 
DR advocates encourage the redirection of state and local funds allo-
cated for CPS general operations to the DR system.20 This finance 
reform idea, again, cuts against the principles animating ASFA. 
ASFA’s goal of getting CPS and courts to put a higher priority on 
child interests and child protection calls for an increase, not a de-
crease, in CPS resources.  
 The history21 here is important in understanding the nature of 
this new movement and the risks it presents to children. DR is a suc-
cessor to two earlier “reform” movements similarly designed to keep 
more children at risk of maltreatment at home with their parents: 
Intensive Family Preservation Services (IFPS)22 and Racial Dispro-
portionality.23 All three movements have engaged in a similar strate-
gy, impressive in its sophistication. The advocacy groups involved in 
each movement have promoted the policy reform initiative; promoted 
the self-serving but fundamentally flawed research designed to give 
the impression that the new policy was successful; launched cam-
paigns to persuade a broad range of players from policymakers, to 
academics, to media of its wisdom; and promoted implementation by 
                                                                                                                                       
 18. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 21. See discussion infra Part I.  
 22. See generally BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 114-21 (describing IFPS programs and 
research).   
 23. See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Wel-
fare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 873-74 (2009).  
2015]  DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE 579 
 
 
child welfare administrations throughout the nation and by state and 
federal legislatures.24 
 In the past, these reform initiatives have largely collapsed as the 
research has been found flawed and fraudulent and as the risks to 
children have become obvious. But memories in the child welfare 
field seem short.  
 History is repeating itself with the DR movement. DR advocates 
make the familiar claim that DR is “evidence based,” that it will save 
money by reducing foster care and thus costs to the state, but magi-
cally that it will not put children at any risk.25 However, the flaws in 
the DR research are blatantly obvious, as is discussed in Part IV be-
low. The risks DR poses for children are similarly obvious. Research 
shows that children on the traditional CPS track are at enormous 
risk of repeat maltreatment by their parents. If kept at home, most 
will continue to be abused and neglected. If removed to foster care 
and then returned home, most will be again abused and neglected. 
The large majority of the CPS caseload that DR is designed to move 
to the voluntary track are not minor “dirty house” or “mere poverty” 
cases, as advocates often contend. CPS legislation is designed to pro-
tect poor parents from state intervention based on circumstances 
beyond the parents’ control. The cases in which CPS intervenes gen-
erally involve serious drug and/or alcohol abuse, forms of “neglect” 
that are known to destroy kids’ chances for normal development, and 
situations where serious violence exists but is simply not obvious.26 
 We do need to protect children better. Families on the CPS case-
load are not receiving the supportive and rehabilitative services they 
need. Children are not receiving the protection they need.  
 But there is no reason to believe that simply removing the power 
of CPS to monitor these families, to require cooperation with rehabil-
itative treatment, and to remove children from parents will work 
better to protect children. Research reveals that while it is hard for 
parents to free themselves from drug and alcohol addiction, coercive 
pressure to engage in treatment does sometimes work.27 Polite re-
quests to engage in treatment on a purely voluntary basis are not 
likely to work better or, indeed, as well.28 
                                                                                                                                       
 24. See supra notes 22-23; infra Parts I.A, I.B, II, IV, V.C.  
 25. See Parts IV.B.1.d,IV.B.1.e, IV.B.4.b. 
 26. For documentation of the claims in this paragraph, see BARTHOLET, supra note 1, 
at 82-85, 233-35; Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: 
Effective Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 
BUFF. L. REV. 1323, 1323-24 (2012); discussion infra Part III.A, III.B.1.a, III.B.1.b.i. 
 27. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.b.i.  
 28. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.b.i. 
580  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:573 
 
 We need to strengthen the CPS system, provide it with more re-
sources to monitor parents, and provide more parents with more re-
habilitative services. We need to do a version of differential treat-
ment but within, and not outside of, the context of the CPS system; 
so rehabilitative treatment can be required, not just suggested, and 
so children can be protected in cases in which parents are unable or 
unwilling to take the necessary steps to become capable of nurturing.  
 CPS should, of course, be targeting different kinds of family situa-
tions with different types of treatment—to a great degree, CPS does 
that now. For many families, that means keeping the children at 
home with supportive and rehabilitative services. But CPS will need 
more resources to do its job better. It keeps many children at home 
now with few, if any, services provided,29 in significant part because 
it is forced to triage and devote most of its limited resources to the 
most serious cases. 
 We also need to strengthen CPS by improving its ability to protect 
children through removal and through termination of parental rights 
and adoption, as needed. Nobody wants children to go through unnec-
essarily the disruption of removal to foster care or termination of pa-
rental rights and adoption. But research reveals that foster care oper-
ates to protect children against the risk of death and other serious 
harm at home.30 It would work better for children if more often it was 
followed by timely termination of parental rights and adoption.31 Adop-
tion works well for children, generally, but it works best when they 
have not suffered lengthy periods of maltreatment or foster drift.32 
 DR proponents claim that by removing significant numbers of 
children from the CPS system, they will free that system to do a bet-
ter job for the most serious abuse and neglect cases.33 But DR is de-
signed not simply to remove children from the CPS system, but also 
to weaken that system. The goal is not simply to divert children, but 
also to divert resources from the already resource-starved system to 
                                                                                                                                       
 29. See PATRICIA L. KOHL, UNSUCCESSFUL IN-HOME CHILD WELFARE SERVICE PLANS 
FOLLOWING A MALTREATMENT INVESTIGATION: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES 5 (2007), 
available at http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/UnsuccessfulIn-Home.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5FLG-A5AM (stating that in the overwhelming majority of cases that come 
to the attention of CPS, the child is kept at home with a biological parent or another care-
giver and with many families—even those with substantiated maltreatment—not receiving 
services).  
 30. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 31. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 97, 110.  
 32. Id. at 179; Bartholet, supra note 23, at 896-97.  
 33. Daniel Heimpel & Elizabeth Bartholet, DCF Shift Puts Children’s Safety at Risk, 
THE HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 24, 2014, available at http://articles.courant.com/2014-01-
24/news/hc-op-dheimpel-connecticut-dcf-children-safety-at--20140124_1_dcf-response-
children, archived at http://perma.cc/LNJ3-UR3G.  
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fund the new voluntary track system. It would leave CPS less, not 
more, able to appropriately handle the most serious cases. 
 There are reasons why many child welfare leaders keep promoting 
extreme family preservation movements. Child maltreatment is root-
ed in poverty and in the conditions associated with poverty, including 
unemployment, substance abuse, and devastated neighborhoods.34 
Those committing child maltreatment are themselves victims. Many 
who have promoted extreme forms of family preservation over the 
years see CPS intervention—including, in particular, removal to fos-
ter care and adoption—as yet another form of victimization.35 And 
they see the kinds of financial support family preservation programs 
like DR provide as at least some help in alleviating some of the fi-
nancial needs of poor parents. 
 But DR cannot be justified as a poverty program. It provides pa-
thetically limited financial stipends to a small and irrationally se-
lected subset of the poor—those who abuse and neglect their chil-
dren. This will do nothing significant to change poverty conditions in 
our society.  
 Worse, DR sacrifices a subset of poor children—those abused and 
neglected—condemning them to a childhood of suffering that will also 
limit their life opportunities as adults. If our society honored children 
as having moral worth equivalent to adults and honored child human 
rights as being equivalent to adult human rights, we would not toler-
ate the extreme family preservation policies that regularly reappear. 
Children would be seen as having a fundamental human right to 
grow up with nurturing parents, a right of equal importance to the 
adult right to raise children free from state intervention.  
 We do need to address the conditions of poverty that create child 
maltreatment, but we need to address them in a serious way, 
through radical social change. In the meantime, we need to develop 
targeted maltreatment prevention programs designed to reach par-
ents before they fall into the dysfunction associated with child mal-
treatment. And for those children victimized by serious maltreat-
ment, we need a CPS system that is strengthened enough to provide 
real protection through adequate supportive services, required reha-
bilitation programs, quality foster care, and adoption for those chil-
dren whose parents cannot provide nurturing parenting. 
                                                                                                                                       
 34. See Bartholet, supra note 23, at 874-76. 
 35. Id. at 887. 
582  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:573 
 
I.   PRIOR HISTORY: EXTREME FAMILY PRESERVATION 
MOVEMENTS SUPPORTED BY ADVOCACY RESEARCH 
 I have written previously of the corrupt merger of policy advocacy 
with research in the movements supporting both IFPS and Racial 
Disproportionality.36 Here I will briefly summarize the highlights. 
There are other family preservation movements with similar charac-
teristics; but the IFPS and Racial Disproportionality movements best 
illustrate the troubling dynamics that have characterized child wel-
fare advocacy and related research over the last few decades and that 
are at issue in the DR movement today. 
A.   Intensive Family Preservation Services 
 IFPS was avidly promoted from the 1970s through the 1990s by 
the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation and the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation.37 It swept the nation and was adopted by many states’ 
child welfare systems. The basic idea was to define children who are 
identified as abused and neglected as being “at risk of removal” to 
foster care, with the goal of keeping as many as possible at home. 
The means was to provide social worker support services on an inten-
sive basis for roughly six weeks based on the absurd notion that child 
maltreatment was typically a short-term crisis.  
 The research evaluating IFPS focused not on how well or badly 
the program served child interests, but instead on whether IFPS suc-
ceeded in its goal of keeping children at home, thus saving the state 
money through the reduction of foster care costs. It took years for 
child welfare experts to focus on the flaw at the heart of the research, 
namely that it paid no attention to child interests. Eventually those 
analyzing the research also noted that IFPS failed even to succeed in 
its family preservation goal. In the end, the program was seriously 
discredited and largely abandoned.38  
 One article provides a telling critique of the earlier IFPS research, 
noting methodological problems, failure to reduce removal, and fail-
ure to focus on child well-being. It concludes with a call for more ap-
propriate research in the future: 
                                                                                                                                       
 36. See Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1334-35, 1340-42; Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a 
Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: The Use and Misuse of Research, 13 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 8-15 (2014) [hereinafter Bartholet, The Use and Misuse of Research]; 
see generally Bartholet, supra note 23 (focusing solely on Racial Disproportionality). 
 37. See Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1332; see also BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 141, 
154; RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST 
CHILDREN’S LIVES 122-35, 139-40 (1996).  
 38. GELLES, supra note 37, at 139-40; IRA M. SCHWARTZ & GIDEON FISHMAN, KIDS 
RAISED BY THE GOVERNMENT 44-46 (Simon Hakim ed., 1999).  
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[M]ore attention should be directed toward determining whether 
the child’s overall functioning has improved because of the services 
received. Has abuse or neglect reoccurred? Have the child’s growth 
and development been optimized? Has the child’s cognitive and so-
cial development shown changes for the better? These and other 
outcomes will need to be addressed to obtain a clearer understand-
ing of the benefits and limitations of family preservation. . . . Al-
ternatives to family preservation, such as permanency planning 
(adoption) and foster care, also must be reexamined . . . . Applying 
family preservation to every family, as a matter of policy, may ac-
tually be placing children at risk.39 
 Richard Gelles documents in Book of David the degree to which 
this private foundation advocacy was responsible for the IFPS 
movement and for its success for many years in changing the nation’s 
child welfare system: 
[T]he expansion of the concept of family preservation and the 
growing support for the programs[] . . . could not have been 
achieved without the support, financial and otherwise, of two large 
and influential foundations. The Edna McConnell Clark Founda-
tion . . . and the Annie E. Casey Foundation[] . . . played crucial 
roles in the selling, or overselling, of family preservation. 
Both foundations marketed family preservation with a near-
religious zeal and substantial financial support. They funded start-
up and demonstration programs and then promoted them. 
[They] became the official repositories of expertise and data on 
family preservation. State, local, and federal agencies and offi-
cials . . . relied on the two foundations for their evaluation data. 
. . . . 
When the believers are foundations who can invest millions of 
dollars each year in touting the programs and when the critics 
are academics who merely publish their research results in 
scholarly journals, the outcome is entirely predictable. State and 
local agency heads, legislators and legislative aides, governors 
and presidential administrations were told about the unqualified 
successes of family preservation and the tremendous cost sav-
ings. The skeptics and critics were either unknown or cast as 
merely academic gadflies.40 
                                                                                                                                       
 39. Amy M. Heneghan et al., Evaluating Intensive Family Preservation Programs: A 
Methodological Review, 97 PEDIATRICS 535, 541 (1996); see also Viola Vaughan-
Eden & Frank E. Vandervort, Invited Commentary on “Issues in Differential Response,” 23 
RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 550, 551-52 (2013) (discussing the relevance of the IFPS history 
to the DR movement).  
 40. GELLES, supra note 37, at 133-35.  
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B.   Racial Disproportionality 
 Racial Disproportionality was avidly promoted by various Casey 
Foundations,41 together with a broad consortium of establishment 
child welfare organizations, in the early part of this century.42 What 
came to be known as the Casey Alliance led the movement, working to 
get every state to adopt policies designed to reduce the number of 
black children removed to foster care with the goal of achieving a 
match between their percentage of the foster care population and their 
percentage of the general population. The Alliance also began work to 
get the federal government to condition its funding of state child wel-
fare systems on their ability to achieve this “racial equity” goal. 
 The basic idea was that the removal of black children in numbers 
disproportionate to their population percentage was caused by cur-
rent racial bias in the child welfare system. This racial bias claim 
relied almost entirely on research known as the National Incidence 
Study (NIS), which stated in its 1996 NIS-3 Report that actual rates 
of maltreatment by black and white parents were the same, and ac-
cordingly, that bias must explain the different rates of removal to 
foster care. 
 The Casey Alliance used its wealth both to promote policy advoca-
cy on these issues and to fund related research. For example, it ap-
proached states throughout the country saying: we will help study 
your racial disproportionality problem, write the report stating the 
nature of your problem, and then help solve your problem with ap-
propriate new policies. These state reports’ claims regarding bias 
almost all come back to the NIS research. 
 The Casey Alliance successfully sold the idea that racial bias in 
the CPS system was responsible for the number of black children in 
foster care to policymakers, academics, and the media. But the claim 
on which the racial bias theory was primarily based, that black mal-
treatment rates were the same as white maltreatment rates, was false. 
The NIS-3 Report’s own data, hidden in a later-published appendix, 
showed that actual black maltreatment rates were higher than white 
maltreatment rates, and that the difference in rates approximated the 
difference in official maltreatment reports and related removal rates. 
There was a lot of other evidence available to the Casey Alliance 
demonstrating that the NIS-3 claims regarding comparative rates 
and system bias were likely wrong. A major conference on Racial Dis-
                                                                                                                                       
 41. The Casey organizations were the Anne E. Casey Foundation, Casey Family Ser-
vices, Casey Family Programs, The Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initiative, and the 
Marguerite Casey Foundation. Bartholet, supra note 23, at 880. 
 42. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1340-42; Bartholet, The Use and Misuse of 
Research, supra note 36, at 9-15. For more specifics on the Racial Disproportionality 
movement summarized here, see generally Bartholet, supra note 23.  
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proportionality at Harvard Law School (HLS) in 2011 presented re-
search by many eminent social scientists demonstrating that there 
was no basis for the NIS-3 claims in the authors’ own data, and that 
the claims were inconsistent with persuasive, independent research.  
 By the time of this HLS conference, the NIS-4 Report had been 
released, and the authors had conceded that then, with a larger sam-
ple, they found a statistically significant difference between actual 
black and white maltreatment rates, without conceding any error in 
their previous claims regarding comparative rates and racial bias.  
 The conference organizers co-authored a paper, published as an 
Issue Brief by the conference co-sponsor, Chapin Hall at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, a highly respected research institute. The paper stat-
ed that the evidence presented at the conference helped demonstrate 
that higher rates of black family contact with the child welfare sys-
tem reflected higher rates of actual maltreatment. It concluded: 
We believe that the evidence presented at this conference signals 
that it is time for reconsideration of certain past assumptions and 
conclusions. It indicates that generally there is a significant 
black/white maltreatment gap, one that roughly parallels the gap 
in official maltreatment reports. This evidence contradicts the be-
lief that black children are included at high rates in the child wel-
fare system because of racial bias.43  
I concluded in a related article: 
At a minimum, the [Racial Disproportionality] claim regarding 
discrimination was irresponsible, and grounded on bad social sci-
ence that flew in the face of a large body of contrary evidence. It 
helped make the case for keeping more black children with par-
ents accused of maltreatment, despite the fact that if black chil-
dren were subject to disproportionately high rates of maltreat-
ment, they should for their own protection be removed at similar-
ly high rates.44 
 The Racial Disproportionality movement has been significantly 
disrupted. A chapter in the recent publication, Handbook of Child 
Maltreatment, concludes that the HLS conference and my related 
work have resulted in a change in the dialogue on this issue, such 
that racial disproportionality can no longer be equated with racial 
bias, and proportionate representation can no longer considered be 
an appropriate goal.45 However the movement has not been entirely 
                                                                                                                                       
 43. See Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Race and Child Welfare, CHAPIN HALL 4 (June 
2011), http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/publications/06_27_11_Issue%20Brief_ 
F.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7GAL-LSJN.  
 44. Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1343.  
 45. Alan J. Dettlaff, The Evolving Understanding of Disproportionality and Dispari-
ties in Child Welfare,  2 CHILD MALTREATMENT HANDBOOK149-68 (Jill E. Korbin & Richard 
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derailed.  Movement proponents continue to promote its claims and 
goals. And many of those supporting the movement have simply 
shifted energy and resources toward supporting DR.46  
 In DR we see the historical pattern playing out once more. We 
again have powerful private organizations mounting a sophisticated 
campaign to promote an extreme family preservation policy. We 
again have self-serving research deployed as a central part of the 
strategy, research that ignores important child interests in safety 
and well-being. We again have policymakers blindly accepting the 
research claims and embracing this new silver-bullet fix that promis-
es to improve the child welfare system while saving states money. 
 We also are beginning to see the emergence of a serious challenge 
to the DR movement. Some of this is based on a debate that has 
erupted in the social science community, with the validity of the ad-
vocacy research that the DR movement has propagated now being 
questioned by independent social scientists.47  
II.   NATURE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE MOVEMENT 
A.   Program Characteristics 
 While DR programs vary in details, most share certain core essen-
tials, and DR proponents advocate for these essentials.48 
1.   The Diversion Goal 
 DR is designed to divert a large percentage of the cases that are 
traditionally under CPS jurisdiction to the new, voluntary AR track. 
Advocates often talk of diverting something in the range of 70% of 
CPS cases.49 Current programs vary significantly in the percentage 
                                                                                                                                       
D. Kingman eds., 2014), available at http://link.springer.com/ 
chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-7208-3_8. 
 46. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 16-22. Many argue that DR 
will help to reduce disproportionality and many keep track of race statistics as part of their 
DR analyses. Id.  
 47. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
 48. See, e.g., RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 9 (listing in a chart core essentials and 
differences between Family Assessment Response and Traditional Investigative Response); 
see also MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5-13 (contrasting AR and TR). 
 49. Elizabeth Bartholet & Daniel Heimpel, Through the Cracks, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
24, 2013, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/12/24/saving-children-
from-our-child-welfare-system/euxaDvobzhfhY7zpm1CYmO/story.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AXK9-WTRW; Daniel Heimpel, Are Child Protection Quotas Endangering 
Minnesota Children?, THE CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL CHANGE, Sep. 22, 2014, available at 
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/news/are-child-protection-quotas-endangering-minnesota-
children/8162, archived at https://perma.cc/5YPW-QWN6 (quoting Eric Fenner, the manag-
ing director at Casey Family Programs, who stated that they had “goals of 70 percent”); see 
also Daniel Heimpel, Does Race Influence Child Protection Efforts in Minnesota?, 
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diverted, from 8% to over 70%, with the percentage in any given pro-
gram generally increasing over time.50  
 The cases to be diverted are characterized as low-risk, or low- to 
medium- risk, though as discussed below there are serious ques-
tions as to whether these characterizations actually fit the cases 
being diverted.51  
 Diversion at the front end reduces the likelihood that children will 
ever be removed from their parents. If children are not under CPS 
jurisdiction in the first place, then CPS is less likely to accumulate 
the evidence supporting a removal to foster care or termination of 
parental rights and adoption. This fits with the longstanding Casey 
Family Programs goal of reducing foster care by 50% by 2020.52 Ca-
sey makes clear that it links DR with this reduction goal.53 That goal 
also fueled the Racial Disproportionality movement, with Casey 
thinking it could achieve half of its foster care reduction goal just by 
eliminating disproportionality.54 
2.   Voluntary, Not Coercive 
 The AR track is entirely voluntary for parents. At the outset, they 
can accept or reject the offer to participate in the AR program, with 
no consequence for rejecting it. They can also start down the AR 
track but can get off of it at any point they choose, again with no con-
                                                                                                                                       
STARTRIBUNE, Oct. 17, 2014, available at http://www.startribune.com/does-race-influence-
child-protection-efforts-in-minnesota/279629742/, archived at http://perma.cc/W9Y8-J45N.  
 50. See Theodore P. Cross et al., What Will Happen to this Child if I Report? Out-
comes of Reporting Child Maltreatment, Presentation at the APSAC Conference 20 (June 
2014) (on file with author); see also Alicia Kyte et al., Evaluating Where We’re at with Dif-
ferential Response, 37 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 125, 129 (2013) (stating that approximate-
ly 60% to 80% of cases are diverted to a DR track in many states); C. Nicole Lawrence et 
al., Multiple Response System: Evaluation of Policy Change in North Carolina’s Child 
Welfare System, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 2355, 2364 (2011) (stating that 70% to 
80% of cases in the North Carolina system were diverted to DR programs and 42% to 71% 
of cases were diverted to DR programs in other states). 
 51. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.a.iii (discussing the evidence as to the actual risk 
level of the cases being diverted).  
 52. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, MOVING TOWARD HOPE: PATHS TO KEEP CHILDREN 
SAFE, MAKE FAMILIES STRONG AND BUILD SUPPORTIVE COMMUNITIES 5 (2013) (“When we 
launched our 2020 Strategy for America's Children in 2006, some questioned our goal to 
safely reduce by 50 percent the number of children in foster care in the U.S. by the year 
2020.” (statement of Shelia Evans-Tranumn, Chair, Board of Trustees)); CASEY FAMILY 
PROGRAMS, 2008 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 
CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with author).  
 53. 2008 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 23  (“Casey Fami-
ly Programs has championed differential response for several years as an effective practice 
that safely reduces the number of children entering foster care. Our paramount goal is to 
safely reduce the number of children in foster care by 50 percent by the year 2020.”). 
 54. Id. at 33.  
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sequence.55 Thus, parents who are thought to be responsible for child 
maltreatment and who are assigned to the AR track can simply walk 
away from any rehabilitation services or requirements and any moni-
toring or surveillance. 
 Evidence that parents continue to mistreat their children can gen-
erate a decision to move the family that is initially assigned to AR to 
the traditional or TR track,56 but the system is not designed to place 
much emphasis on looking for such evidence. AR track social workers 
might become aware of maltreatment, in which case they would be 
obliged as mandated reporters to report it to CPS. But the overall 
goal of the AR system is to embrace diversion and parent-friendly 
policies, and it appears that generally, little emphasis is placed on 
identifying maltreatment. 
 Also, parents who refuse participation from the outset will not be 
seeing social workers, so there will not be the kind of evidence of mal-
treatment that would surface when parents meet regularly with so-
cial workers as required in the traditional CPS system.  
 In fact, only a tiny percentage of AR families are actually 
switched from the AR to the TR track based on social workers’ con-
clusions that children were wrongfully assigned to AR or were oth-
erwise in danger. The state reports that reveal evidence of switch 
rates show rates ranging from 2% (Virginia),57 to 3% (Colorado),58 to 
3.5% (Illinois);59 to 4% (Ohio)60; and for three New York counties, 
from 0.3%, to 1.2%, to 5.6%.61 These figures are troubling given the 
                                                                                                                                       
 55. Kathryn A. Piper, Differential Response in Child Protection Services: A Compari-
son of Implementation and Child Safety Outcomes in Eight States 39 (June 17, 2014) (un-
published dissertation, Brandeis University) (on file with author). 
 56. In the Colorado system, safety concerns may trigger a referral from AR to TR. 
See MARC WINOKUR ET AL., SOCIAL WORK RESEARCH CTR. AT COLO. STATE UNIV., 
PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE COLORADO CONSORTIUM ON DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: 
FINAL REPORT 25-26 (2014), available at http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/ 
colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/subs/can/QIC-DR/Documents/Program% 
20Evaluation%20of%20the%20Colorado%20Consortium%20on%20Differential%20Respo
nse%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/37ZP-Y4BL.  
 57. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., EVALUATION OF THE 
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE SYSTEM 12 (2008), available at https://www.dss.virginia.gov/ 
files/about/reports/children/cps/all_other/2008/differentialresponsesystem_evaluation_an
nualreport_2008_12-08.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/N6MN-SUH8. 
 58. WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 34. 
 59. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 30 (noting that another 
9.8% were switched based on new screened-in maltreatment reports). 
 60. L. Anthony Loman & Gary L. Siegel, Effects of Approach and Services Under 
Differential Response on Long Term Child Safety and Welfare, 39 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
86, 91 (2015), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0145 
213414002099, archived at http://perma.cc/7EZQ-N7U8 (percentage calculated based on 
Ohio figures given). 
 61. RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 38. 
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evidence that a huge percentage of children in AR families are sub-
jected to ongoing maltreatment.62 
3.   No Fact-Finding Investigation and No Maltreatment Findings 
 In a DR system, there is generally no traditional CPS fact-finding 
investigation at the outset to determine whether the alleged mal-
treatment actually occurred and, if so, to assess the related family 
dynamics in connection with deciding the track on which cases be-
long. Instead, a “safety assessment” determines the track, often 
based simply on the limited information gathered in the initial hot-
line call reporting the incident to CPS, together with certain eligibil-
ity criteria.63 While some DR systems depart from the movement ide-
al and use an investigation to make the initial tracking decision, 
most do not.64 The most influential researchers promoting DR’s suc-
cess state: “A primary assumption underlying DR is that the adver-
sarial approach of traditional investigations seeking to validate or 
invalidate allegations of child maltreatment is unnecessary for all 
but the most extreme and criminal reports of child abuse and ne-
glect . . . .”65 This assumption governs both the initial approach to the 
tracking decision and subsequent dealings with the family. 
 For the first AR home visit, an appointment is made, as compared 
to the unannounced first visit in the traditional CPS system. In AR 
there is no separate interview of the child at risk or other witnesses, 
as compared to the traditional CPS practice of interviewing alleged 
victims and other witnesses out of the presence of the alleged perpe-
trator. Separate interviews are what one would do to find out what 
happened and whether, for example, a burn on a child is the result of 
an accident or deliberate torture. But the point in AR is to be parent 
friendly, and investigations focused on what parents might have 
wrongfully done to a child are not thought of as friendly. Accordingly, 
there is a deliberate effort to avoid focusing on the alleged maltreat-
ment and to avoid identifying the perpetrator.66 Instead, the focus is 
                                                                                                                                       
 62. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.a.iii. 
 63. Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 500 (“[S]creeners in DR programs typically make 
recommendations for case acceptance, establish the priority for agency response, and recom-
mend a track assignment based on information collected in a referral telephone interview—
information that is typically limited in scope and depth and potentially in accuracy.”). 
 64. GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 (showing that a majority of surveyed juris-
dictions make the track assignment decision during the central intake/hotline call); 
RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 45-46; see also Cross et al., supra note 50, at 4, 6.  
 65. Loman & Siegel, supra note 61, at 87.  
 66. See, e.g., Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 501 (“A defining characteristic of the 
alternative DR track is that caseworkers neither substantiate allegations of child mal-
treatment, nor do they confirm the perpetrator. . . . [Many claim] it unnecessary (and in-
herently disrespectful) to push families to talk about an alleged maltreatment incident or 
to determine who was responsible for its occurrence.”); id. at 501-02 (inquiring about mal-
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supposed to be on the family’s needs and how services might best 
meet those needs to reduce the risk to children. 
 For related reasons, there is no finding of maltreatment and no 
report of perpetrators to a central registry, by contrast to the tradi-
tional CPS system.67  
4.   Financial Support Emphasized over Rehabilitative Services 
 Many DR programs provide special funding for their AR tracks, 
giving AR social workers additional and more flexible funds to pro-
vide financial support for parents, as compared to traditional CPS 
workers.68 Accordingly, AR track programs often provide more gener-
ous financial support services than their corresponding CPS pro-
grams. Special selection and training for AR workers orients them to 
be more supportive of parents and less critical, as compared to tradi-
tional CPS workers.  
 AR programs generally favor financial support over rehabilitative 
services, as compared to corresponding CPS programs. So, for exam-
ple, AR services often consist primarily of financial subsidies for rent 
payments, the purchase of household appliances, and the like, while 
CPS programs are more likely to emphasize rehabilitation services 
designed to enable parental fitness, such as drug and alcohol rehabil-
itation services and anger management counseling.69 
B.   Related Finance “Reform” 
 DR advocates have invested a lot in efforts to change the federal 
system for funding state child welfare systems. The federal govern-
ment funds roughly half of all state child welfare budgets, so federal 
financial policy is all-powerful in determining state child welfare pol-
icy.70 States simply cannot afford not to do what the federal govern-
ment says they must do as a condition of receiving federal funds. 
                                                                                                                                       
treatment dynamics, determining who was responsible, identifying child victim, not con-
sidered routine part of information gathering, and often actively discouraged).  
 67. BRETT BROWN ET AL., DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: EARLY IMPLEMENTATION AND 
FIDELITY, CROSS SITE REPORT OF NATIONAL QUALITY IMPROVEMENT CENTER ON 
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 7 (2012), available at 
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/subs/can/
DR/qicdr/General%20Resources/General%20Resources/docs/cross-site-report-may-2012.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/58CC-ZE89; Loman & Siegel, supra note 61, at 87. 
 68. See MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5, 10, 32, 83. 
 69. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1.c, IV.B.4.b. 
 70. See generally AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL FUNDING FOR CHILD 
WELFARE SERVICES, available at http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/children/ 
federal-funding-for-child.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y549-2HJB; EMILIE STOLTZFUS, 
CHILD WELFARE: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND THEIR CURRENT FUNDING 
(2015), available at http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook. 
waysandmeans.house.gov/files/R43458_gb_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5WLQ-FCCK; 
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 Casey Family Programs has been a major presence, lobbying in 
the Administration and Congress in recent years for what it calls 
federal finance reform.71  It has worked with the American Humane 
Association (AHA) to get other important organizations to join this 
effort, including the Child Welfare League of America, the National 
Association of Public Child Welfare Administrators, the Center for 
Law and Social Policy, and the Children’s Defense Fund.72 This has 
become an increasingly important strategy for expanding DR na-
tionwide and, if successful, would free up vast new resources for DR 
programs while simultaneously diverting those resources away from 
the traditional CPS system and, in particular, foster care.73  
 The first step in the program is to enable and encourage states to 
shift on an experimental and short-term basis some of their federal 
foster care funding to a new DR system.74 The second step will be a 
push to make this shift in funds long term and mandatory.75 This 
step would require change in the underlying federal child welfare 
financing system.76 
 Significant progress has already been made on the first step. Con-
gress passed the Child and Family Services Improvement and Inno-
vation Act in 2011,77 allowing states to conduct five-year demonstra-
tion projects with funds saved from reducing foster care. Many states 
have been using these “Title IV-E waivers” to fund DR programs.78 
                                                                                                                                       
Robert Longley, Federal Funding for Child Welfare: Some States Struggle to Meet Needs, 
GAO Finds, ABOUT NEWS, available at http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/ 
federalbenefitprograms/a/Federal-Funding-For-Child-Welfare.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/BH6A-5MFK (stating that federal funding varies by state from 25-80%). 
 71. Casey and its allies are promoting their finance reform ideas through, for exam-
ple, testimony at congressional hearings, participation in House and Senate foster care 
caucuses, financing publications issued by partner organizations, and their own marketing 
materials. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11 at 4-5, 26-28; see generally, e.g., 
The Antwone Fisher Story as a Case Study for Child Welfare: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Fin., 113th Cong. 8-10 (2013) (statement of Eric Fenner, Managing Director of Casey 
Family Programs); Preventing Child Abuse and Improving Responses to Families in Crisis: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Healthy Families and Cmtys. of the H. Comm. on Educ. 
and Labor, 111th Cong. 16-18 (2009) (statement of Caren Kaplan, Director of Child Protec-
tion Reform, AHA).  
 72. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 26-28.  
 73. Id. at 4, 23-24. 
 74. Id. at 25-26. 
 75. Id. at 26. 
 76. Id. at 6, 38-58, 60-64 (detailing Casey’s monumental finance reform campaign of 
recent years). 
 77. Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-34, 
§ 201, 125 Stat. 369, 382 (2011). The Act requires states to certify that they are using DR 
for children found not to be at risk of imminent harm. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-320, § 115, 124 Stat. 3459, 3467-74; see MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 17.  
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Casey believes that these waiver programs will create momentum for 
more structural changes to the federal child welfare financing system. 
 Meanwhile, Casey has embarked on a major push to enlist advo-
cates and policymakers in support of the second step. This multi-
faceted effort has included developing and submitting a finance re-
form proposal to a key Congressional committee,79 and funding coali-
tions and forums dedicated to pursuing finance reform (including the 
Partnership to Protect Children and Strengthen Families80 and, more 
recently, a Brookings Institute-led series of meetings with congres-
sional and Administration staff).81 The Casey policy team also rou-
tinely presents at child welfare gatherings around the country about 
the need for finance reform.82  
                                                                                                                                       
 78. Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act, §§ 101–03; see gen-
erally Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 25. The 2011 Act permits a 
waiver of the normal requirement of Title I-E of the Social Security Act that funds saved by 
reducing foster care must be returned to the federal government. See CASEY FAMILY 
PROGRAMS, DR RESOURCE KIT, supra note 7, at 6; see generally JAMES BELL ASSOCIATES, 
INC., PROFILES OF THE TITLE IV-E CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS 
(2013), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/waiver_profiles_vol2.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GN9D-9TJ5 (describing, on a state by state basis, child welfare 
demonstration projects). 
 79. See generally CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, ENSURING SAFE, NURTURING AND 
PERMANENT FAMILIES FOR CHILDREN: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL FINANCE REFORM 8 (2010) 
(discussing Casey’s involvement in making a push for child welfare reform), available at 
http://www.casey.org/media/WhitePaper-NeedForFinanceReform.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9TRP-TQJ5. The Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support is 
now known as the Subcommittee on Human Resources. See Press Release, U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, Chairman Camp Announces Republican 
Membership on Ways & Means Subcommittees for 112th Congress (Jan. 6, 2011), available 
at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=219142 (stat-
ing that the Subcommittee on Human Resources was known as the Subcommittee on In-
come Security and Family Support during the 110th and 111th Congresses). 
 80. See Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 45-53. 
 81. See id. at 53-58. 
 82. Recently, Casey Staff prepared and helped guide the California Child Welfare 
Council through a series of proposals that would expand the array of services eligible for 
federal reimbursement to include those, like DR, that “meet the needs of a child and their 
family in a family-based setting.” CAL. CHILD WELFARE COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD 
WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: THE CALIFORNIA FRAMEWORK 2, available at 
//www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/3_CA%20Framework%20for%20Finance%20Reform.pdf (last 
visited July 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4WFB-2772; see generally CAL. CHILD 
WELFARE COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: A CALL TO ACTION TO 
SUPPORT CALIFORNIA FAMILIES (2013), available at http://www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/ 
4_CalltoAction_Finance%20Reform.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7R4Q-QHWU; CAL. 
CHILD WELFARE COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: A TOOLKIT FOR 
CALIFORNIA (2014), available at http://www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/1_Finance%20Reform 
%20Toolkit%20Overview.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DN7R-GHK6; CAL. CHILD 
WELFARE COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: FACT SHEET, available at 
http://www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/2_%20Fact%20Sheet%20on%20Finance%20Reform.pdf 
(last visited July 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N9J7-TYTA; CAL. CHILD WELFARE 
COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: THE CALIFORNIA FRAMEWORK, 
available at http://www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/3_CA%20Framework%20for%20Finance 
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 Simultaneously, states are being encouraged to shift some of their 
general CPS support funds from traditional CPS activities to help 
fund new DR programs—the logic being that as significant numbers 
of cases are diverted from CPS to DR, expenses for such traditional 
CPS activities as investigation and monitoring should go down.83 
 The DR movement strategy has been to use the latest stage of self-
serving research— conducted as part of the QIC-DR project discussed 
below84—to demonstrate to the federal Administration and Congress 
that DR is an evidence-based success story warranting a major shift 
of federal funds toward DR. But that latest stage of research did not 
come out as positively as DR proponents had hoped. This, together 
with the debate in the research community that has erupted and 
other obvious problems with DR, all discussed below, should encour-
age those in charge of federal finance policy to consider the pros and 
cons of DR before radically changing our child welfare financing sys-
tem in ways that threaten children. 
III.   RISKS TO CHILDREN POSED BY DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE 
A.   Risks to Children in the Current System 
 Many think that CPS fails children by not providing enough in the 
way of monitoring, rehabilitative services, removal to foster care, and 
termination of parental rights so they can move on to nurturing, 
adoptive homes. I tried to document this case, showing that the sys-
tem is currently guilty of under-intervention, rather than over-
intervention, in my 1999 book, Nobody’s Children.85 Part of the prob-
lem has to do with unduly limited resources, and another part with 
undue deference to family preservation and parental rights by both 
CPS and the courts.86  
 DR advocates claim that their program is justified, in part, be-
cause CPS fails to provide services to so many of the cases in its ju-
risdiction.87 But an obvious solution to this problem would be to pro-
                                                                                                                                       
%20Reform.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4WFB-2772 (lasted visited July 26, 2014) 
(documents provided at March 12, 2014 meeting of the California Child Welfare Council). 
 83. E-mail from Ronald Hughes, Executive Director, North American Resource Center 
for Child Welfare and the Institute for Human Services (HIS/NARCCW), to author (July 
11, 2014, 3:32 PM) (on file with author); e-mail from Sean Hughes, Managing Partner, 
Social Change Partners, LLC, San Francisco, CA.,  to author (July 11, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
 84. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4. 
 85. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 98-110.  
 86. Id. 
 87. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 8; Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention: 
Differential Response in Child Protection, 21 BROOK. J. OF L. AND POLICY 73, 75-76 (2012), 
available at http://practicum.brooklaw.edu/sites/default/files/print/pdfs/journals/journal-
law-and-policy/volume-21/issue-1/jlp_v21i_2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/63P7-GE87; 
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vide CPS with more resources so that it could provide more extensive 
supportive and rehabilitative services.  
 There are many different indications of the fact that children are 
at undue risk for abuse and neglect in the current system. First, offi-
cial reports indicate that one in eight children will be found by CPS 
to have been maltreated.88 Also, official maltreatment reports provide 
a serious underestimate of the actual maltreatment suffered. For 
example, retrospective self-reports reveal that 40% of children will be 
maltreated during childhood.89 Moreover, while official reports are 
down recently, hospital data show children at increasing risk of suf-
fering and dying from severe maltreatment.90 
 Second, experts on child maltreatment know that most children on 
CPS caseloads are at serious risk of the kind of abuse and/or neglect 
that jeopardizes the ability to grow up healthy and emotionally  
capable of living a fulfilling life. “[T]he vast majority of families who 
come to the attention of CPS are quite dysfunctional. Many are  
overtly pathological and either unable or unwilling to make the 
changes necessary to provide for their children’s physical and  
emotional safety and/or to provide a minimal level of responsible 
care . . . .”91 The great majority of CPS children—some 70% to 90%—
are living with parents addicted to drugs and/or alcohol.92 By defini-
tion, these should be considered cases in which children are at seri-
ous risk.93 
 Third, newspaper stories regularly chronicle deaths of children at 
the hands of their parents, despite the fact that CPS workers are 
supposed to be monitoring their welfare.94 These situations often in-
                                                                                                                                       
Patricia Schene, The Emergence of Differential Response, 20 PROTECTING CHILDREN 4, 4-5 
(2005), available at http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/children/differential-
response/pc-20-2-3pdf.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/45Q8-TJ5K. 
 88. Christopher Wildeman et al., The Prevalence of Confirmed Maltreatment Among 
US Children, 2004 to 2011, 168 JAMA PEDIATRICS 706, 706 (2014). 
 89. Id. at 707, 710.  
 90. While child welfare substantiated maltreatment rates have gone down in recent 
years, the maltreatment-related severe injury rates recorded in hospital records rose some 
5% from 1997 to 2009. John M. Leventhal & Julie R. Gaither, Incidence of Serious Injuries 
Due to Physical Abuse in the United States: 1997 to 2009, 130 PEDIATRICS 847, 850 (2012), 
available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/130/5/e847.full.pdf+html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/MUR2-UDLD. 
 91. Vaughan-Eden & Vandervort, supra note 39, at 551.  
 92. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 68; see also id. at 67-81, 207-32; John P. Seasock, 
Identifying Abuse and Neglect in Children Whose Families are Affected by Chemical De-
pendence, APSAC, http://www.apsac.org/assets/documents/2014_Colloquium/2014_Handouts/ 
81%20workshop.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8E9H-ZT72 
(stating that substance abuse exists in 40% to 80% of families where children are abused). 
 93. See sources cited supra note 92.    
 94. See, e.g., Yvonne Abraham, Jeremiah Oliver Was a Little Boy Lost, BOS. GLOBE, 
Dec. 19, 2013, at B1; Michael Levenson et al., State Family Agency Fires Two in Case of 
Boy Feared Dead, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2013, at A1; Michael Levenson, State Promoted 
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volve cases previously categorized as neglect rather than abuse—cases 
of the kind that DR advocates argue can be assumed to be minor.95 
Such stories regularly describe the dangers of extreme family preser-
vation bias96 and bemoan CPS failure to intervene more actively in the 
form of both protective monitoring and removal to foster care.97 
 Fourth, official reports on child welfare problems, often triggered 
by child deaths, regularly fault CPS for providing inadequate super-
vision and protection for children and fault legislators as well for the 
limited funding they provide for CPS.98 These reports regularly call 
for more funding for CPS so that it can reduce worker caseloads and 
provide better surveillance for children kept at home, more rehabili-
tative services, and more aggressive intervention.99  
                                                                                                                                       
Social Worker Before Firing Her, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2013, at A1; Jenifer McKim, Savage 
Toll of Abuse for Children in DCF Care, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2014, at A1, available at 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/02/02/massachusetts-children-under-state-protection 
-die-from-abuse-with-alarming-frequency/2TcwcpIbWnrANkKKQs1CVP/story.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/CSK4-5F4W; Carol Marbin Miller & Audra D.S. Burch, Preserv-
ing Families But Losing Children, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 16, 2014), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/projects/2014/innocents-lost/stories/overview, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6SML-83SS. 
 95. The Jeremiah Oliver case, Abraham, supra note 94, is one in which the great 
majority of prior allegations involving the family had been for neglect, with many screened 
out, and the family had a history of such issues. Nonetheless, Jeremiah was killed after 
going missing for four months without CPS being aware, and the mother and her boyfriend 
were charged with murder. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 
REPORT 9-11 (2014), available at http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/press-release/140528-
cwla-final-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UAS5-ND6V.  
 96. See, e.g., Innocents Lost: A Miami Herald I-Team Investigation, MIAMI HERALD 
(Mar. 16 2014), http://media.miamiherald.com/static/media/projects/2014/innocents-lost/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GU2S-LAK8. This series helped trigger sweeping child welfare 
reform legislation in Florida. See Mary Ellen Klas & Carol Marbin Miller, Florida Senate 
Moves Forward with Child Welfare Law Overhaul, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:09 
PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/legislature/florida-senate-moves-forward-
with-child-welfare-law-overhaul/2173291, archived at http://perma.cc/DZX2-89KB (describ-
ing that the Innocents Lost Series’ influenced Florida to reform its child welfare legislation 
through an amendment to Florida Senate Bill 1666); e-mail from Judge Jeri Cohen, of the 
11th Judicial Circuit, Miami-Dade County, Florida, to author (May 4, 2014, 03:47 PM) (on 
file with author).  
 97. Miller & Burch, supra note 94 (describing the reduction in foster care and in chil-
dren under CPS supervision at home thought to be responsible for the rising number of 
child deaths).  
 98. See, e.g., UMESH DALAL, AUDITOR’S REPORT ON THE RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES (2013), available at http://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/ 
richmond.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/8/bc/8bcd4476-b8bd-11e2-8442-0019bb30f31a/ 
518bc1cb199c3.pdf.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K5P9-GZU7; Robert Zullo, Social Ser-
vices Director Retires After Scathing Report, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (May 9, 2013, 6:44 
PM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/local/city-of-richmond/article_fc5d04b8-b8ba-
11e2-a6cb-0019bb30f31a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H5LX-ZFSN.  
 99. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 95, at 50 (providing recom-
mendations based on the investigation following Jeremiah Oliver’s death); see also Todd 
Wallack, Report Urges Smaller Caseloads, Closer Scrutiny at DCF, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 13, 
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/03/13/report-dcf-needs-more-funding-care-
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 Finally, social science provides persuasive evidence of the unduly 
limited protection offered by CPS.100 Among cases reported to CPS 
hotlines each year, roughly one-third are re-reported within twelve 
months,101 and since reports are thought to be good indicators of ac-
tual past maltreatment and good predictors of future maltreatment, 
this tells us that children are at undue risk. Roughly one-third of 
children who died from maltreatment were known to CPS prior to 
their deaths.102  
 Emily Putnam-Hornstein has demonstrated in impressive recent 
work that for children known to CPS, “high rates of re-reporting and 
maltreatment recurrence” reveal “widespread system failures to ade-
quately and appropriately respond to child abuse and neglect.”103 Out 
of children referred to CPS for maltreatment before their first birth-
day, 82% remained in the home, and among those, more than 60% 
were referred again before the age of five.104 Out of those remaining at 
home following substantiation of the initial maltreatment allegation, 
58% who received no formal services were re-referred by the age of 
five, and 65% of those receiving such services were re-referred by that 
age.105 The net is that CPS almost always keeps children reported for 
maltreatment at home and then generally fails to protect them from 
repeated maltreatment, regardless of whether or not it provides ser-
vices. Earlier research over several decades shows that from one-third 
to one-half of children who are once identified as abused or neglected 
and who are kept at home are revictimized within a few years.106 
 The DR research confirms the high risks to children on the tradi-
tional CPS track as well as the new AR track, showing that re-report 
                                                                                                                                       
for-kids/RKkjP7sCqEzFWsXZQfrteK/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DLC6-V872 
(describing the 2014 interim report triggered by the Jeremiah Oliver case). 
 100. See generally BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 98-110 (discussing studies, hearings, 
and cases that suggest more intervention is necessary).  
 101. Amy Conley & Jill Duerr Berrick, Community-Based Child Abuse Prevention: 
Outcomes Associated with a Differential Response Program in California, 15 CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 282, 282 (2010); see also KOHL, supra note 29, at 17 (noting that over one-
third of children kept at home had re-report or foster placement within thirty-six months). 
 102. NANCY PEDDLE ET AL., CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND 
FATALITIES: THE 2000 FIFTY STATE SURVEY 15 (2002), available at 
http://www.issuelab.org/resource/current_trends_in_child_abuse_prevention_reporting_and
_fatalities_the_1999_fifty_state_survey, archived at http://perma.cc/4DND-59KY.  
 103. Emily Putnam-Hornstein et al., Strengthening CPS Ability to Protect Infants and 
Young Children Against Maltreatment 1 (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/cap/cap-conferences/pp-workshop/pp-materials/ 
21_strengthening-cps_putnam_hornstein.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3XCP-GLUU. 
 104. Emily Putnam-Horstein et al., Risk of Re-reporting Among Infants Who Remain at 
Home Following Alleged Maltreatment, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1, 2, 9-10 (2014).  
 105. Id. at 2.  
 106. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 109; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1325 n.3. 
2015]  DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE 597 
 
 
rates are extremely high on both tracks, ranging between one-third 
to two-thirds, depending on the length of the follow-up period.107  
 By contrast, research indicates that removal to foster care serves 
to protect children from risk. First, the rates of abuse and neglect 
are tiny in foster care—less than 1% annually.108 Second, Jill Duerr 
Berrick makes a persuasive case that most research, including the 
more recent research that attempts to control for important varia-
bles, shows foster care removal generally serves children’s best in-
terests in terms of such factors as risk of violence to children, child 
“risk behaviors,” child quality of life, and other measures of safety 
and well-being.109 
 The child-friendly reform move would be to strengthen the CPS 
system by providing it with significantly more resources and by en-
couraging increased intervention. That intervention should take the 
form of expanded supportive services as well as expanded require-
ments that parents cooperate with rehabilitative services. It should 
take the form of expanded monitoring and, in the most serious cases, 
expanded use of the powers to remove children to foster care and to 
                                                                                                                                       
 107. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1, 2, 4.  
 108. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2012, at 50 tbl.3-16 (2013), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BV7Y-
XC52. The comprehensive federal government report on child maltreatment says that half 
of the states met the standard of 99.68% for absence of maltreatment (49% in 2012), and 
the rest had higher than 99% absence, except for three states which had absence rates of 
98.35% or higher. Id. Not a single state fell below 98.35%. Id. 
 109. JILL DUERR BERRICK, TAKE ME HOME 108-17 (2009). The major exception was one 
study indicating that in cases considered “marginal,” children may do better at home than 
suffering the disruption and uncertainty that often accompanies foster care placement. Id. 
at 110-11. While one recent article claims that “numerous studies” show foster care pro-
duces more harm, the author cites only two studies, and Berrick’s analysis demonstrates 
that they are of limited relevance.  The study Berrick characterizes as the best is one by 
Taussig, Clyman, and Landsverk. See e-mail from Jill Duerr Berrick, Zellerbach Family 
Found., Professor, Univ. of Cal. at Berkley, to Daniel Heimpel (Sept. 25, 2013, 01:42 AM) 
(on file with author). They find, consistent with prior research, significantly worse out-
comes for reunified children and conclude:  
There was, and continues to be, a pervasive belief that reunification is best for 
children, despite the lack of research to support this assertion. . . . Evaluation 
of child welfare policy and practice should be based . . . on the impact of . . . [re-
unification] on behavioral health outcomes for children. . . . [A]n often missed 
voice in the debate about what is in the best interest for children in foster care 
is the voice of the youth themselves. Studies that have interviewed current and 
former foster children report that the youth generally had positive feelings 
about being placed in foster care. Most youth thought it was in their best inter-
est and reported that things would have gotten worse at home without child 
welfare intervention.  
Heather N. Taussig et al., Children Who Return Home From Foster Care: A 6-Year Prospec-
tive Study of Behavioral Health Outcomes in Adolescence, PEDIATRICS, July 2001, at 6, 
available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/108/1/e10.full.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ND4W-8KN8 (citations omitted). 
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terminate parental rights. England has been moving in just this di-
rection since the highly publicized death of a young child kept at 
home with his mother and is now celebrating the increase in the 
number of children adopted out of foster care as a triumph for child 
well-being.110 
 DR is, of course, designed to move in the exact opposite direction, 
diverting the great majority of CPS cases to the voluntary AR sys-
tem, reducing CPS funding, and as a consequence, reducing all forms 
of CPS support and intervention.  
B.   New Risks From Differential Response 
 The DR move to divert some 70% of CPS cases to a purely volun-
tary track111 and to reduce CPS funding dramatically by diverting 
CPS funds to the DR track, poses obvious and serious risks to child 
well-being.  
1.   Risks from Diversion to Voluntary Track 
(a)   Serious Risk Cases on the Voluntary Track 
i.   Diverted Cases are Serious Risk by Definition Given Nature of 
CPS Caseload 
 As discussed above,112 most cases on the traditional CPS caseload 
are cases in which children face serious risks. Diverting the great 
majority of CPS cases to a voluntary track where parents are free to 
simply walk away—escaping any mandatory monitoring, required 
rehabilitative treatment, and potential for child removal—poses ob-
vious risks to children. This is why DR advocates have always felt 
compelled to defend their systems as not likely to increase safety 
risks. Their arguments are not persuasive. 
 DR advocates claim that only low-risk cases will be diverted and 
point to the fact that most CPS cases are in the neglect category as 
evidence that a majority of cases can be safely diverted.113 The simple 
                                                                                                                                       
 110. See, e.g., Angela Harrison, Adoptions Show ‘Record’ Increase, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-24282211, archived at http://perma.cc/PNC-
8UVE; see also Mary Welstead, Child Protection in England – Early Intervention 2-3 (May 
10-11, 2012) (unpublished workshop article) (on file with the Harvard Law School as part 
of the Prevention and Protection Brainstorming Workshop), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/cap/cap-conferences/pp-workshop/pp-
materials/27_welsteaddoc.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5QZL-QJBD (stating how there 
was public outrage after a child’s death in England and that the public called for measures 
to ensure child safety).  
 111. See supra note 49.  
 112. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
 113. Amy Conley, Differential Response: A Critical Examination of a Secondary Preven-
tion Model, 29 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1454, 1456 (2007); C. Nicole Lawrence et 
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categorization of a case as neglect is a major factor in DR decisions to 
track them as AR cases.114 But it is frivolous to contend that neglect 
cases are by definition minor, involving mere poverty or dirty houses. 
Children in the neglect category are at risk of dying at rates roughly 
equal to those in the abuse category.115 Most neglect cases involve 
parents addicted to drugs and/or alcohol who are incapable of provid-
ing the nurturing parenting that children need, until and unless the 
parents solve their addiction problems.116 Accordingly, child neglect 
often means the kind of traumatic stress that “literally change[s] the 
architecture of the child’s brain systems in ways that may perma-
nently impair the child’s functioning in every domain of develop-
ment—sensory, emotional, cognitive, and social.”117 Many neglect 
cases involve abuse issues categorized as neglect simply because the 
latter is easier to prove.118 
 Even assuming that some cases now on the CPS caseload are truly 
minor and pose limited risk to children, this characterization does 
not fit a significant percentage and certainly nothing approaching the 
70% DR diversion goal. 
ii.   Absence of Investigation Means No Ability to Identify Which 
Cases Are Serious Versus Minor 
 DR programs have no way of identifying which cases are truly less 
risky, warranting diversion to the voluntary track. As discussed 
above,119 DR prides itself on not conducting at the outset, in making 
the decision of how to track cases, the fact-finding investigation that 
would be needed to determine which are the high-risk as compared to 
the low-risk cases. There is no effort to determine whether the al-
leged maltreatment took place and, if so, who the perpetrator was 
and what the underlying family dynamics were. Nor is there an in-
vestigation once the case is put on the AR track, since any focus on 
                                                                                                                                       
al., Multiple Response System: Evaluation of Policy Change in North Carolina’s Child 
Welfare System, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 2355, 2355-56 (2011) (showing that 
neglect cases are generally assigned to the AR track in various DR systems).  
 114. See, e.g., Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 501 (noting that one state reportedly 
tracked all neglect referrals to AR).  
 115. See Fatalities Due to Child Abuse and Neglect, AM. HUMANE ASS’N, 
http://www.americanhumane.org/children/stop-child-abuse/fact-sheets/fatalities-due-to-child-
abuse-neglect.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6BWW-W4VP.  
 116. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 67-68. 
 117. Frank E. Vandervort et al., Building Resilience in Foster Children: The Role of the 
Child’s Advocate, 32 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., 1, 4 (2012); see generally CHARLES A. NELSON ET 
AL., ROMANIA’S ABANDONED CHILDREN (2014) (reviewing brain science and demonstrating 
the devastating impact of neglect on early development). 
 118. See generally, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 65-67 (discussing how neglect 
cases are extremely serious, and that CPS often use the neglect category because it is 
easier to prove than abuse).  
 119. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
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what the parents might have done to the child is considered incon-
sistent with the parent-friendly ethic, as is any separate interview of 
the child or other witnesses. 
 Common sense alone is enough to make this absence of investiga-
tion suspect. If a child has a suspicious burn, asking the child in front 
of the parent whether the burn resulted from an accident or from a 
parent’s deliberate application of a hot iron is not likely to produce an 
honest answer, if the child is indeed at risk of violence from the par-
ent. If police respond to an emergency call involving domestic vio-
lence and find a woman injured and weeping, would anyone today 
think it appropriate to insist that no separate interview of the wom-
an be conducted and that, instead, the man and woman be kept to-
gether for a family-friendly assessment of future risks so as to decide 
on the appropriate response? 
 Professional expertise confirms that fact-finding investigations 
designed to figure out what actually took place in connection with the 
alleged maltreatment—including separate interviews of the child in a 
safe-feeling neutral space—are key elements of an appropriate as-
sessment of future risk to the child.120 Several workshops at a recent 
colloquium given by the leading professional association on child 
maltreatment, the American Professional Society on the Abuse of 
Children (APSAC), emphasized the importance of such investigations 
and revealed the degree to which separate interviews of the child are 
the accepted professional mantra.121 Michigan has a law requiring 
that children be interviewed separately.122 
 Many in the child welfare field have emphasized in recent years 
the importance of increasing the depth and scope of traditional CPS 
investigations, enabling CPS workers to make better decisions as to 
the appropriate response. They note the importance of including the 
“history of child maltreatment” in that assessment.123 They promote 
the use of multidisciplinary teams that “interview and examine fami-
                                                                                                                                       
 120. See, e.g., Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 501 (“[F]ormal risk assessments—
particularly the more reliable and valid actuarial risk assessments—are difficult to com-
plete fully or accurately without face-to-face family contact and a deeper exploration of a 
family’s circumstances, including the presence and dynamics of previous maltreatment.” 
(internal citation omitted)); Vaughan-Eden & Vandervort, supra note 39, at 551 (“Obvious-
ly, one primary problem is that CPS cannot know which families will fall into this [risk] 
category until it has conducted an investigation. . . . [A]bsent such an investigation, chil-
dren’s safety cannot be assured.”).  
 121. See, e.g., Julie Kenniston & Rita Farrell, First Responder Interviews: Called by So 
Many Names, but How Should I Really Be Doing Them?, AM. PROF’L SOC’Y ON THE ABUSE 
OF CHILD. (May 22, 2014), http://www.apsac.org/assets/documents/2014_Colloquium/ 
2014_Handouts/32%20workshop.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EJZ3-E3BP. 
 122. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.628c (2014).  
 123. Vandervort et al., supra note 117, at 8. 
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ly members in an effort to determine the likelihood, nature, and/or 
extent of child maltreatment and develop an intervention plan.”124  
 The Federal Government has weighed in on the need for more 
careful, in-depth factual assessments. The Children’s Bureau has 
said that “[a]ssessment forms the foundation of effective practice 
with children and families[]”125 and found in its most recent Child 
and Families Services Review that CPS agencies were too often “not 
sufficiently comprehensive to capture underlying family issues, such 
as substance abuse, mental illness, and domestic violence, that may 
contribute to maltreatment.”126  
 Many child welfare systems have sought to provide increasing 
protection to children by combining civil child protection services 
with law enforcement approaches, enabling more thorough investiga-
tions and more comprehensive responses.127 One prosecutor ex-
pressed her concern with the move to adopt DR as follows: 
I am deeply disturbed by the impact this will have on our ability to 
protect children. . . . With DR, . . . child services are now prohibited 
from sharing information with law enforcement, and prosecutors. 
This will have a terrible impact on our ability to protect the chil-
dren that fall within . . . [the DR] category . . . .128 
This is not to say that the full forensic investigation thought appro-
priate in criminal child abuse cases is required in all child welfare 
cases. But a meaningful inquiry into the facts that enables child wel-
fare workers to know what happened in the past, so as to illuminate 
future risk, is required. 
 The social science supports common sense and professional exper-
tise in making the absence of a fact-finding investigation troubling. 
There is a general consensus among serious students of the child 
welfare system, based on extensive evidence, that the best predictor 
                                                                                                                                       
 124. Kathleen Coulborn Faller et al., Can Early Assessment Make a Difference in Child 
Protection? Results from a Pilot Study, 2 J. OF PUB. CHILD WELFARE 71, 73 (2008).  
 125. Family-Centered Assessment, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/famcentered/caseworkpractice/assessment.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/M7VB-2UB9.  
 126. DIANE DEPANFILIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD NEGLECT: A 
GUIDE FOR PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION app. D, at 102 (2006), available 
at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/neglect/neglect.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X78X-FXNF.  
 127. The CAPTA requires this as part of the state’s plan in order to receive federal 
funding. See Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36, 117 Stat. 
800 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (2006)).  
 128. E-mail from Christine O. Corken, Attorney, First Assistant, Dubuque Cnty., to 
author (Mar. 21, 2014, 2:46 PM) (on file with author).  
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of whether child maltreatment will occur in the future is whether it 
has occurred in the past.129  
 AR’s failure to make factual findings documenting in CPS files 
that maltreatment has occurred and its failure to list perpetrators on 
maltreatment registries pose additional safety issues. If children are 
reported in the future as being victimized again, social workers and 
others will be denied the best evidence of the need for protective in-
tervention. As but one indication of the problem, the federal govern-
ment monitors state child welfare systems for maltreatment recur-
rence and uses as a measure of recurrence the substantiation of mal-
treatment after a previous substantiated report. By definition, any 
maltreatment that parents on the AR track are responsible for will 
not be substantiated; and accordingly, any subsequent maltreatment, 
even if substantiated, will not count for purposes of this federal 
measure of child safety.130 
iii.   Evidence to Date Indicates Serious Risk Cases Are in Fact 
Diverted to the Voluntary Track 
 There is increasing evidence in the research on DR that many of 
the cases diverted to the AR track are, in fact, characterized by seri-
ous rather than minor risk. One California DR study found that al-
most half of the AR sample cases analyzed in the program were ei-
ther “high risk” or “very high risk,” despite the claimed goals of di-
verting only low-risk cases.131  
                                                                                                                                       
 129. Rosemary Chalk, Background Paper: Major Research Advances Since the Publica-
tion of the 1993 NRC Report Understanding Child Abuse and Neglect: Highlights from the 
Literature, in IOM/NRC 2012 RESEARCH WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 158. The 
Children’s Research Center, responsible for the extensive work on Structured Decision 
Making, found based on years of research designed to build reliable risk assessment in-
struments that prior maltreatment was the most relevant risk factor in estimating the 
likelihood of future maltreatment. See e-mail from Judith S. Rycus, Program Dir., Inst. of 
Human Servs., N. Am. Res. Ctr. for Child Welfare, to Frank E. Vandervort, Clinical Profes-
sor of Law, Univ. of Mich., and Daniel Heimpel (June 1, 2014, 11:55 PM) (on file with au-
thor); see also Daniel Heimpel, Not for Your Consideration, THE CHRONICLE OF SOC. 
CHANGE (June 3, 2014), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/news/not-for-your-
consideration/6875?print=1, archived at http://perma.cc/3B32-WS4A (quoting experts to the 
effect that prior maltreatment and reports of same are the best predictors of future  
maltreatment).  
 130. See MGMT. AUDIT COMM., DEP’T OF FAMILY SERVS., WYOMING CHILD PROTECTIVE 
SERVICES 26 (2008) available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/progeval/reports/ 
2008/CPS/CPSfullreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6W85-8NCV; U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S 
BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1998: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, ch. 1.2 (1998), available at 
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm98/cpt1.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
RB5Q-9P87;.Piper, supra note 55, at 9-10.  
 131. Conley & Berrick, supra note 101, at 289.  
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 Even the advocacy research that purports to find DR successful 
documents the serious risk characterizing many cases on the AR 
track. A 2010 Ohio study found that almost half of the AR cases had 
at least one past report of abuse and neglect, and almost 15% had 
four or more prior reports.132 A recent Colorado study noted that 76% 
of the AR cases were medium risk and 10% were high risk.133 
 The research also shows that ongoing maltreatment rates on the 
AR tracks are extremely high. The California study noted above re-
veals a one-third re-report rate within the brief nine-month AR 
treatment period.134 Even the lead authors of the early advocacy re-
search supporting DR, Tony Loman and Gary Siegel, note the “high 
rates of recidivism.”135 Their 2014 Ohio Report shows that roughly 
half of all AR families received at least one subsequent family risk 
assessment.136 Their 2004 Minnesota Report says the overall re-
report rate is about one in three families during a relatively short 
tracking period of two to three years.137 It predicts that long-term 
rates would rise to something like the general CPS recurrence rate of 
65%.138 In an interview, Tony Loman indicated that typically in his 
DR research, he found an unduly high re-report rate, noting that in 
the Missouri DR program, the rate was 50% to 60% after five to sev-
en years.139  
 And while the DR system is supposed to have a method for send-
ing high-risk cases back from the AR to the TR track, this rarely 
happens as discussed above—available evidence indicates that only a 
tiny percentage of AR cases are sent back to the TR track based on 
social worker reevaluation of safety risk.140 Richard Barth, a highly 
                                                                                                                                       
 132. L. ANTHONY LOMAN ET AL., INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, OHIO ALTERNATIVE 
RESPONSE EVALUATION FINAL REPORT 42 fig.4.6 (2010), available at 
http://www.iarstl.org/papers/OhioAREvaluation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8SA5-AD87.  
 133. See, e.g., WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 41 tbl.4.3. 
 134. Conley & Berrick, supra note 101, at 286. 
 135. L. Anthony Loman & Gary L. Siegel, Effects of Anti-Poverty Services Under the 
Differential Response Approach to Child Welfare, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1659, 
1666 (2012). For discussion of Loman’s and Siegel’s roles in the DR movement, see discus-
sion infra Part IV.  
 136. See L. ANTHONY LOMAN & GARY L. SIEGEL, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, OHIO 
ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE EVALUATION EXTENSION: FINAL REPORT viii (2014), available at 
http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/children/differential-response/pc-dr-ohio-
section2-final-evaluation-report-1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZAP7-7CZ4.  
 137. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 136, at 141-42. 
 138. Id. A recent Loman and Siegel Ohio study reveals that nearly half of the families 
in the combined group of AR and TR cases had one or more screened-in re-reports. Lo-
man & Siegel, supra note 61, at 8. 
 139. Telephone Interview with L. Anthony Loman (Oct. 18, 2013). L. Anthony Loman is 
a research director at the Institute of Applied Research in St. Louis, Missouri.  
 140. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (noting that only 0.3% to 5.6% of child welfare 
cases in the states and counties assessed are moved from an AR track to a TR track based 
on such reevaluation). 
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respected child welfare expert, says that unless AR cases are referred 
back “a substantial amount of the time (25% perhaps), then the sys-
tem isn’t working.”141 
(b)   Voluntary Track Inappropriate for Serious Risk Cases 
i.   Need for Monitoring, Supportive and Rehabilitative Services, 
and for Protective Intervention Authority 
 DR proponents claim that voluntary will work better than coer-
cive, because parents will respond to the parent-friendly approach by 
cooperating with services. They bolster their case by pointing to the 
research that allegedly shows AR track parents receive more services 
and appear to be more positively engaged with their workers than TR 
track parents. 
 But there is every reason to think that the children on the AR 
track in the cases involving serious risk are more likely to suffer on-
going maltreatment because of the entirely voluntary nature of the 
system.  
 First, as discussed above, most parents charged with maltreat-
ment have fallen into serious dysfunctional patterns that often in-
clude a combination of substance abuse and addiction, domestic vio-
lence, and mental illness.142 Few will be able to escape those patterns 
on their own volition. While there are limited helpful studies of the 
comparative benefits of voluntary versus coercive programs, some 
evidence in the area of substance abuse treatment indicates that co-
ercion works better.143 Tellingly, in the 2004 Minnesota DR study, 
when AR workers were asked which parents were least likely to ben-
efit from AR, the most common response was parents involved in 
substance abuse.144 
                                                                                                                                       
 141. E-mail from Richard Barth, Dean, University of Maryland School of Social Work, 
to author (July 1, 2014, 9:35 PM) (on file with author). Barth served as a consultant to the 
IOM/NRC project discussed below, and its report cites his concerns regarding the low 
switch rate. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 142. See supra Part III.A. 
 143. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 219, 286-87 n.21 (“[S]uch research as exists 
indicates that coercive pressure is in fact useful.”); Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1337 n.43 
(citing family drug court expert comments at the Prevention and Protection Workshop held 
at Harvard Law School on May 11, 2012); see also Piper, supra note 55, at 27 (stating that 
most studies show mandatory programs work better than voluntary ones for substance 
abuse treatment enrollment and retention but not for long-term abstinence, and also not-
ing that these studies involve non-equivalent comparison groups making conclusions re-
garding effectiveness problematic). 
 144. L. ANTHONY LOMAN & GARY L. SIEGEL, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, MINNESOTA 
ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT 68 (2004), available at 
http://www.iarstl.org/papers/ARFinalEvaluationReport.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6GTV-SLKZ.  
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 Second, once parents are identified as maltreating their children, 
research shows that services are unlikely to enable them to recover 
from their problems sufficiently to avoid ongoing maltreatment.145 
The traditional CPS system’s authority to impose monitoring by so-
cial workers, to require cooperation with rehabilitative treatment, 
and in the most serious cases, to remove children and terminate pa-
rental rights, enables it to protect children when parents pose ongo-
ing threats to child safety and well-being.146 
ii.   The Dropout Problem: Highest Risk Cases Most Likely to Drop 
Out 
 In addition, we know that the highest-risk parents are those most 
likely to drop out and that they will drop out at very high rates. This 
means that they will not receive the AR track services and will not 
engage with the AR workers in the ways meant to assure us that the 
risk of maltreatment will be reduced. It means that they will escape 
any monitoring by AR social workers and any attention by workers 
connected with AR-related social service programs that might pro-
vide the potential for child maltreatment being noticed and reported. 
All of this means, in turn, that their children will have seriously re-
duced opportunities for protective intervention in the event that their 
safety and well-being are threatened.  
 The research on Early Home Visitation has taught us enough to 
be concerned about the potential DR dropout problem. Home Visita-
tion programs have similar goals to DR, including the reduction of 
child maltreatment. They serve similarly troubled populations, offer 
a range of supportive services, and operate on a similar voluntary 
model, with parents free to reject participation without conse-
quence.147 They have been studied extensively for decades. The best of 
the programs, with the best evidence of success in helping to reduce 
the risk of maltreatment, have extremely high dropout rates—between 
one-third and one-half of all those parents targeted.148  
 A thorough 2014 report on Early Home Visitation by Mathematica 
Policy Research and Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago149 re-
                                                                                                                                       
 145. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 109-10; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1337-38; Harriet 
L. MacMillan et al., Effectiveness of Home Visitation by Public-Health Nurses in Prevention 
of the Recurrence of Child Physical Abuse and Neglect: A Randomised Controlled Trial, 365 
LANCET 1786, 1792 (2005) (showing that a model home visitation program, promising in 
reducing the likelihood of maltreatment among first-time parents, had no success in reduc-
ing maltreatment among parents once identified as having victimized their children). 
 146. See Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1337-38.  
 147. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 163-75. 
 148. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 169-70, 277 n.17, 1353 n.85.  
 149. See generally KIMBERLY BOLLER ET AL., MAKING REPLICATION WORK: BUILDING 
INFRASTRUCTURE TO IMPLEMENT, SCALE-UP, AND SUSTAIN EVIDENCE-BASED EARLY 
CHILDHOOD HOME VISITING PROGRAMS WITH FIDELITY (2014), available at 
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veals the extent of the problem. Dropout rates for the long-term pro-
grams ranged from 27% to 42% at the twelve-month stage.150 Fami-
lies typically received only half of the home visits expected.151 In the 
very successful Nurse Family Partnership program, only 45% to 62% 
of the planned visits were achieved.152 The report summarizes that 
just over half of the families in all of the studied home visitation pro-
grams remained in services for at least twelve months, and about 
two-thirds of the families in the three long-term programs remained 
in services, noting that these rates are consistent with, and may ex-
ceed, participation rates reported in previous research.153  
 Moreover, this report shows that the Home Visitation dropouts are 
disproportionately those parents most at risk of maltreating their 
children.154 The reasons given for dropping out from Early Home Vis-
itation programs are very significant in understanding DR safety 
risks. Among the primary reasons are “drug abuse, [or] fear [that a] 
home visitor will observe child abuse or illegal behavior.”155  
 DR advocacy research has avoided any focus on the troublesome 
dropout problem. But careful reading of this research reveals what is 
to be expected: a very high dropout rate with the dropouts apparently 
characterized as particularly high risk. For example, the 2011 New 
York DR Report says that 31% of the AR track parents were willing 
to listen but did not act on the worker’s recommendations or service 
offers, and another 6% were completely uninterested or dismissive.156 
A Minnesota CPS spokesperson says that only half of the state’s AR 
track parents chose to participate.157 
 Moreover, the recent QIC-DR research, discussed below,158 demon-
strates both the high rate of dropouts and the high-risk nature of 
these dropouts. This is the only DR research to focus any attention 
on this issue.  
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/documents/EBHV_MakingReplication_Final.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/F35T-54MM (reporting on early child home visiting programs).  
 150. See id. at 38 tbl.III.5. 
 151. Id. at 79. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 80.  
 154. Id. at xvi (“Higher-risk families were more likely to leave the program early.”); see 
also id. at xviii (finding that families with the most challenges were most likely to leave the 
program). Those identified as high risk are the same as those regularly identified as having 
the greatest risk for maltreatment: younger, more economically disadvantaged, and more 
socially isolated participants, including single parents. Id. at 25, 80. 
 155. Id. at 39, 80. 
 156. RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 58.  
 157. Brandon Stahl, Counties ‘Screen Out’ Most Child Abuse Reports, STAR TRIBUNE 
(Apr. 20, 2014, 11:48 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/255888251.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9KKZ-H5J3.  
 158. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.a. 
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2.   Risks From Reducing Financial Support for Traditional CPS 
 DR proponents claim that by removing the low-risk cases to the 
voluntary track, CPS will be able to provide better protection to the 
children at the highest risk.  
 But this claim is belied by the DR finance reform agenda. The 
strategy for financing DR relies on significantly reducing federal fos-
ter care funding and CPS resources more generally, so that in fact 
CPS would have greatly reduced capacity to protect the children on 
its caseload.159  
 The child-friendly reform move would be to expand resources for 
CPS. These resources have shrunk in recent years because of the 
2008 recession and related federal, state, and local budget cuts.160 
This has had its own impact on child safety.  
 Further reducing funds for the resource-starved CPS system will 
put children at a newly frightening level of risk. Common sense sup-
ported by available evidence suggests that CPS will do a better job 
protecting children if it is given adequate resources to pay its social 
workers, reduce caseloads, conduct investigations, provide services, 
collect evidence, take cases to court as necessary to remove children, 
place and maintain them safely in foster care, and in appropriate 
cases terminate parental rights.161 
 There is already some evidence that DR is adversely affecting 
child safety because of this diversion of funds from CPS. In Connecti-
cut, a court monitor supervising the child welfare system reported in 
the fall of 2013: “ ‘Front line staffing levels are inadequate given the 
complexity of cases that now make up the pool of investigation and 
ongoing service cases that social workers have on their caseloads 
since the implementation of the Differential Response System.’ ”162 
Research reports document CPS worker complaints that they are 
overburdened as a result of the diversion of resources to AR.163 Con-
cerns about how this diversion has threatened the safety of children 
                                                                                                                                       
 159. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 160. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 32. 
 161. See, e.g., Cross et al., supra note 50, at 35 (stating that limited CPS resources are 
associated with lower substantiation rates, lower ongoing services rates, and lower child 
placement rates); Faller et al., supra note 124, at 73 (noting that because of the paucity of 
resources, CPS screens out children needing services, conducts narrowly focused investiga-
tions, denies cases in which children need help, and closes cases right after substantiation); 
Jenifer McKim, A Wave of Infants Lost in DCF Families, BOS. GLOBE (July 13, 2014), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/12/babies-under-department-children-and-
families-supervision-suffer-sleep-related-deaths-alarming-rate/kQ5BbcvJFmzUfV6KH6 
IzDN/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7WJ-HXUK. 
 162. Heimpel, supra note 7 (quoting COURT MONITOR RAYMOND MANCUSCO, JUAN F. V. 
MALLOY EXIT PLAN QUARTERLY REPORT 4 (2013), available at www.ct.gov/dcf/lib/ 
dcf/positive_outcomes/pdf/2nd_qtr_report_2013_final_(2).pdf)).  
 163. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.b.  
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on the CPS caseload have been a factor leading a number of states to 
eliminate their DR programs.164 
 One proffered rationale for this federal finance move is an old 
chestnut in the family preservation arsenal. DR proponents claim 
that a disproportionate amount of federal funding goes to removing 
children from their parents for maltreatment as opposed to prevent-
ing maltreatment in the first place.165 One problem with this argu-
ment is that the calculus is based on false factual assumptions—on 
the omission of many very significant federal sources of funds for 
prevention. Casey and others typically rely on a comparison be-
tween the Title IV-E funds provided by the federal government for 
foster care and the IV-B funds provided for prevention services, as if 
this proved their case.166 But this entirely ignores all of the federal 
funds provided for prevention services through welfare and other 
programs.167 
 Also, Casey poses a false choice between funding for prevention 
services and funding for children in out-of-home care. This is the 
choice only if finance reform is done cheaply, in a budget-neutral 
way, with no new resources dedicated to child welfare. Breaking with 
long-standing tradition among child welfare advocates, Casey has 
repeatedly declined to call for new funding, instead assuring policy-
makers that finance reform can and should be done at no cost to the 
federal government.168  
 Casey’s position is, of course, completely consistent with its 2020 
foster care reduction goal. Casey believes that reducing funding for 
foster care will create compelling fiscal incentives for states to limit 
foster care usage.  
 Another problem with the rationale for DR finance reform is that 
DR has little to do with true maltreatment prevention. There is some 
evidence that prevention programs like Early Home Visitation actu-
ally work to prevent maltreatment from occurring in the first place.169 
                                                                                                                                       
 164. See infra Conclusion. 
 165. See generally William C. Bell et al., Guest: Strengthen Investment in Families to 
Help Foster Children, SEATTLE TIMES (June 5, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/ 
opinion/guest-strengthen-investment-in-families-to-help-foster-children/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9S2R-4L9D (discussing how more funds ought to be taken from foster care 
services and put into early intervention services).  
 166. CASEY FAMILY FOUNDATION, MOVING TOWARD HOPE: PATHS TO KEEP CHILDREN 
SAFE, MAKE FAMILIES STRONG AND BUILD SUPPORTIVE COMMUNITIES 9-10 (2013). 
 167. See Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 34-38 (providing the fol-
lowing list of funding sources for prevention services: Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF); Social Services Block Grants; the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood 
Home Visiting Program; Medicaid; and the CAPTA). 
 168. See Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 39. 
 169. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 166-68 (describing the promising research 
on Early Home Visitation programs); Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1347 n.69 (citing more 
recent Home Visitation research). 
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But DR operates after maltreatment has occurred and is designed to 
keep children identified as victims of abuse and neglect with their 
parents, free from any CPS intervention. There is little evidence 
showing the success of supportive service programs targeted at fami-
lies in which abuse and neglect has already occurred, and indeed, 
there is extensive evidence that most of them fail. Such children are 
re-victimized at rates ranging between one-third and one-half when 
kept at home or returned home from foster care.170  
 We must continue to provide services to families in which there is 
significant reason to hope that parents who have committed mal-
treatment can do what it takes to become fit and nurturing. We 
should, indeed, clearly expand such funds. Federal finance reform 
designed to provide additional funds for at-home services would be an 
important step in enabling these efforts. But we should do this within 
the context of the CPS system so that it can act to protect children as 
necessary, using its authority to monitor families, require coopera-
tion with treatment plans, remove children to foster care, and termi-
nate parental rights. 
IV.   RESEARCH ISSUES IN DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE:  
THE CORRUPT MERGER OF ADVOCACY WITH RESEARCH 
 The research picture reflects the problematic pattern of prior his-
tory, as discussed above.171 First, most of the research is designed to 
justify moving in the DR direction, rather than to honestly assess 
whether DR serves child interests and other important goals. It is 
designed to persuade policymakers to adopt DR, rather than to ena-
ble them to decide whether they should do so. This research, referred 
to here as the “advocacy research,” purports to take child safety into 
consideration, but it is not actually designed to assess DR in terms of 
child safety or broader measures of child well-being. It ignores issues 
that would be an obvious focus for attention if the goal really were to 
assess DR’s impact on children.  
 Second, most of the research is produced by people and organiza-
tions with powerful links to those promoting DR rather than by inde-
pendent social scientists who are free to pursue the objective facts 
that should be of greatest interest to policymakers.  
 One group of core organizations and individuals has been heavily 
involved in both the promotion of DR and the research purporting to 
assess its value.172 This group includes Casey Family Programs, the 
AHA, the Kempe Center for the Prevention and Treatment of Child 
                                                                                                                                       
 170. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 109; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1325 n.3; dis-
cussion supra Part III.A.  
 171. See discussion supra Part I. 
 172. See supra Introduction. 
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Abuse and Neglect, and the Institute of Applied Research (IAR). The 
AHA, long active in promoting DR,173 also received with the IAR a 
grant to supervise the important research project conducted by the 
Quality Improvement Center on Differential Response (QIC-DR).174 
The AHA later relinquished its QIC-DR role to the Kempe Center, 
which also played a role in the earlier DR research.175 The QIC-DR 
research was designed to be the culminating research phase that 
would provide the basis for persuading the federal government to 
make a major shift of funds from CPS to DR. IAR senior analysts 
Tony Loman and Gary Siegel had been responsible for most of the 
earlier, highly influential DR advocacy research;176 they also worked 
as influential consultants to the QIC-DR.177 
 Casey Family Programs has played a key role in promoting DR, in 
supporting DR with funding grants,178 and in the DR advocacy re-
search picture. It has put out advocacy documents, which make an 
avid pitch for the DR approach, while claiming at the same time that 
DR is supported by the research. These read as some combination of 
classic advocacy and research. One such document is “The Differen-
tial Response (DR) Implementation Resource Kit,” apparently de-
signed to persuade new jurisdictions to adopt DR and to help them 
implement it.179 This Implementation Kit provides a totally positive 
view of the research, entirely ignoring the devastating critique of DR 
research published by Hughes and Rycus and the related debate 
triggered, which is discussed below.180 It also ignores any discussion 
of other independent research critical of DR.181 Instead, the Imple-
mentation Kit makes the unqualified claim that DR “has demon-
strated improvements in family engagement, worker satisfaction, 
and community satisfaction and cooperation, while maintaining child 
safety.”182 Another such Casey product is the “breakthrough series 
collaborative” report on DR in California.183 This report talks of Cali-
                                                                                                                                       
 173. See RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 13; Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra 
note 11, at 26.  
 174. WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at ix.  
 175. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 26. 
 176. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.a.  
 177. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.b. 
 178. For example, Casey Family Programs helped support the Ohio pilot DR program. 
See Puckett, supra note 1. Casey also provided funds for the New York program, as did the 
Marguerite Casey Foundation. RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 17. See also Introduction for 
Casey Family Programs’ central role in DR. 
 179. See GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 4.  
 180. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
 181. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.  
 182. GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 5. 
 183. See generally CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 13 (overviewing the Casey 
breakthrough collaborative with California on DR).  
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fornia’s “compelling vision” involving DR and claims it is “grounded 
in research and backed by an outcomes-based accountability sys-
tem . . . .”184 The report paints a rosy picture throughout.  
 The problematic merger of policy advocacy with research is fur-
ther illustrated by the DR conference sponsored by the Kempe Center 
in October 2013.185 The conference brochure features DR as a success 
story.186 The conference title is “Differential Response: A Catalyst for 
Change.”187 The introduction claims: “Research and implementation 
experience has shown that, when CPS implements two response 
pathways, practice across the child welfare system improves.”188 The 
opening keynote features a Casey Family Programs staff member, 
and is titled: “What Families Tell Us They Need: Working Together 
to Keep Them Strong and Their Children Safe.”189 A closing breakout 
session features two Casey Family Programs staff members on “Dif-
ferential Response: A Review and Summary of the Research Evi-
dence.”190 This session is summarized as follows: “Differential re-
sponse stands out among child welfare practice approaches because 
of the research evidence of its effectiveness . . . .”191 
 Maryland’s recent decision to adopt DR represents another exam-
ple of this advocacy-research merger.192 Casey Family Programs 
helped stock the state’s advisory council meetings with consultants, 
co-sponsored trips to educate Maryland CPS staff about DR pro-
grams, distributed reports citing IAR positive research findings, and 
then helped IAR get the contract to evaluate Maryland’s new DR 
program.193 
A.   What Child-Friendly Research Would Look Like 
 Appropriate child welfare research would focus on child welfare 
and would be child-friendly. This would mean analyzing the pros and 
cons of DR in terms of child safety and well-being.  
                                                                                                                                       
 184. Id. at i.  
 185. Registration Brochure, Differential Response: A Catalyst for Change, The Kempe 
Center’s 8th Annual Conference on Differential Response in Child Welfare 1 (Oct. 22-25, 
2013), http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/ 
subs/can/DR/Documents/DR%20Conference%20Registration%20Brochure.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/64TG-9USM. 
 186. Id. at 3-16. 
 187. Id. at 1. 
 188. Id. at 2. 
 189. Id. at 5. 
 190. Id. at 15. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Heimpel, supra note 15. 
 193. Id.  
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 Child-friendly research would mean, first, assessing overall 
whether we should move in the DR direction or in just the opposite 
direction, providing more resources to CPS so that it can do a better 
job of protecting children. All agree that there are problems with the 
current system in terms of its failure adequately to protect children. 
There has long been a debate about whether to move in the direction 
of greater or lesser intervention by CPS. We could learn a lot that 
would be helpful in designing a more child-friendly system by com-
paring how children do (1) when new resources are devoted to a vol-
untary track providing supportive services to families, as compared 
to (2) when CPS is given equivalent new resources to support fami-
lies as well as protect children. Such research would help test the 
dubious DR assumption that an entirely voluntary system oriented 
primarily toward providing support will work better for children than 
a system with authority to monitor child safety, require that parents 
cooperate with rehabilitative services, and remove children as needed 
for their protection. 
 Second, given the high re-report rates on families on both AR and 
TR tracks,194 child-friendly research would focus on the dangers to 
children on both tracks and on how we might better protect them. 
Again, this argues for assessing how CPS would do if it were provid-
ed additional resources. 
 Third, child-friendly research would focus on the obvious risks DR 
poses for children to see whether those risks are real. Such research 
would focus on developing methods for accurately assessing the seri-
ousness of the cases diverted to the AR track. It would focus on the 
high dropout rate and develop measures for assessing the maltreat-
ment rate along with other indicators of child well-being in this drop-
out population. It would not rely on re-report rates as indicators of 
the extent of actual maltreatment suffered on the AR track, given the 
many reasons for concluding that such reports underestimate mal-
treatment and fail to accurately reflect differences between rates on 
AR and TR tracks, including that parents dropping out are subject to 
less surveillance by mandated and other potential reporters.195 
 Finally and most importantly, appropriate child-friendly research 
would follow the tradition of true scientific research. It would be con-
ducted by social scientists with no commitment or bias to finding a 
success story in DR. Indeed, without such people designing the re-
search, it is impossible to know all of the questions that good re-
search would investigate and to identify all of the flaws in existing 
research. 
                                                                                                                                       
 194. See discussion supra Part III.A, infra Parts IV.B.1.d, IV.B.2, IV.B.4.a.i. 
 195. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1.d, IV.B.2.  
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B.   Existing Research  
1.   The Early Advocacy Research 
(a)   Promotional Nature & Tone 
 One organization, the IAR, and its two senior analysts, Tony Lo-
man and Gary Siegel, are responsible for most of the influential early 
DR research.196 They produced a series of positive reports touting DR 
as a success story.197 These reports have been the primary basis for 
DR proponents’ claims that DR is an evidence-based program that 
the nation’s child welfare systems should embrace. 
 IAR’s 1997 Report on Missouri’s DR program helped to fuel the 
early DR movement, claiming marginally lower rates of child mal-
treatment recurrence in DR counties, and thus supporting the idea 
that DR was consistent with child safety.198 IAR’s 2004 evaluation of 
Minnesota’s DR program was also very influential.199 IAR followed 
with many other reports, including one on Ohio,200 where Casey Fam-
ily Programs and the AHA had been heavily involved in DR’s devel-
opment.201 The IAR research model also influenced DR research con-
ducted by others.202  
 Only a few of the early studies used random assignment: Missouri, 
Minnesota, Ohio, and New York.203 Each of these studies was conduct-
ed by IAR except New York, which followed the IAR research model.204 
                                                                                                                                       
 196. See WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 1 nn.1-6 (listing then key research reports, 
with five of the six authored by Loman and Siegel). See also Papers & Reports, INST. OF 
APPLIED RESEARCH, http://www.iarstl.org/papers.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/M452-9QG7, for the many DR research studies they have conducted over 
the years.  
 197. Id. 
 198. GARY L. SIEGEL ET AL., INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, MISSOURI FAMILY 
ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE DEMONSTRATION: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 96 
tbls.5.5 & 5.6, 105-06, 212 (1997), available at http://www.iarstl.org/papers/MO%20 
FAR%20Final%20Report-for%20website.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/76SN-YZQV.  
 199. See generally LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144 (reporting on their evaluation of 
Minnesota’s DR program that involved randomized assignment); Heimpel, supra note 15. 
 200. See generally LOMAN ET AL., supra note 132 (reporting on their evaluation of 
Ohio’s DR program). An updated report was released in 2014. See generally L. ANTHONY 
LOMAN & GARY L. SIEGEL, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, OHIO ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE 
EVALUATION EXTENSION: FINAL REPORT (2014), available at http://www.iarstl.org/ 
papers/OhioARFinalExtensionReportFINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W4EU-E5BQ 
(updating previous report on Ohio’s DR program).  
 201. See Tim Morrison & Noah Dzuba, Differential Response – Draft Report 10 (July 
15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See Papers & Reports, supra note 
196, for the various IAR reports.  
 202. See, e.g., RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 31-40 (employing a model to study DR in 
New York similar to IAR reports).  
 203. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 42, 69. 
 204. Id. at 21, 42, 69.  
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 The fact that two people associated with one organization have 
received repeated contracts for producing a series of positive research 
reports is a problem in itself. A significant percentage of all papers 
and reports listed on the IAR website focus on DR.205 IAR, by defini-
tion, has an economic bias in favor of churning out repeat versions of 
the DR success story. It seems unlikely that it would have received 
repeat contracts if its reports had challenged any key DR movement 
premises. IAR co-authors Loman and Siegel support DR advocacy 
efforts with unabashed enthusiasm. For example, Siegel is quoted in 
the Casey Family Programs Implementation Resource Kit, equating 
DR with a precociously brilliant child.206 Supporting the creation of 
new DR management positions, he says: “Every child needs a parent, 
even a child prodigy.”207 This is not the language you would expect an 
objective social scientist to use about a program he is responsible for 
evaluating. 
 The research reports read like advocacy, not independent, neutral 
social science. There is, for example, no section at the end of the re-
ports discussing “limitations” to warn the reader of the limits of the 
research and conclusions that can fairly be drawn or alert the reader 
to further research that would be useful in answering important open 
questions. The reports regularly include rave reviews of DR. The 
2004 Minnesota Report opens its description of study highlights with 
the unqualified claim: “Child safety was not compromised” by the AR 
approach.208 Its introduction states: “As states seek ways to make 
child protection systems more effective, a new paradigm has emerged 
with potential to be a major system reform within child protection.”209 
The reports regularly argue for expansion of DR even though they 
provide very limited evidence of its safety for children. The 2011 New 
York Report sums up its key findings, starting with family engage-
ment and satisfaction and ending with the early evidence that AR 
cases have similar re-report rates as TR cases. Based on this, togeth-
er with a prediction that further follow-up will demonstrate a reduc-
tion in subsequent AR re-reports, it claims “positive evaluation re-
sults” and recommends that the legislature make DR permanent!210 
                                                                                                                                       
 205. Papers & Reports, supra note 196 (listing 12 reports out of 42 listed, or 29%, with 
Differential Response in the title). 
 206. GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7 at 58. 
 207. Id. 
 208. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at vi. 
 209. Id. at 1. 
 210. RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at v-vii, 103. 
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(b)   Parent Satisfaction as Measure of Success 
 When it comes to substance, the early advocacy research fails to 
pass the laugh test. At least it fails if you think that child interests 
should count as central. Each report places enormous emphasis on 
AR’s success in pleasing parents—or what the authors call “fami-
lies”—without specifying that their definition of families excludes 
children. Loman and Siegel, themselves, sum up their work, saying 
“The most consistent finding in our work is that, on average, families 
react more positively to . . . [AR] than to forensic investigations.”211 
Their Minnesota report’s opening highlights summarize: “Most fami-
lies liked the AR approach and responded more positively to workers 
who used it.”212  
 Notably, although children in DR programs range widely in age and 
include a large proportion fully capable of voicing informative opin-
ions,213 no effort is made in the advocacy research to solicit their views. 
 The sections in this research proclaiming parent satisfaction are 
based on surveys of parents on the AR, as compared to the TR, 
tracks. Elaborate statistical charts demonstrate that parents on the 
AR track tend to like their treatment by CPS workers better than 
parents on the TR track. Parents on the AR track are, by definition, 
treated only in a parent-friendly way. They are offered services fea-
turing financial subsidies like rent payments and household pur-
chases. They are not investigated to see how they might have mis-
treated their children. They are not required to do anything. They 
are not told that the state can intervene to protect their children if 
they do not take the steps needed to become fit parents. Indeed they 
are told that they can walk away at any time without consequence.  
By contrast parents on the TR track can be required to engage in 
substance abuse and other rehabilitative treatment. They know that 
if they refuse to cooperate with such demands or if they continue to 
abuse and neglect their children, they risk having the children re-
moved. What is not to like from the point of view of most parents di-
verted to the AR track? How can the IAR authors report this finding 
as if it is enormously significant, as if it constitutes important proof of 
success? 
 And yet, sophisticated DR movement strategists have poured  
millions of dollars into this research in a deadly-serious effort to  
radically change our nation’s child welfare policy. They have appar-
                                                                                                                                       
 211. L. Anthony Loman & Gary L. Siegel, Hughes et al.: Science or Promotion?, 23 RES. 
ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 554, 556 (2013) (emphasis added).  
 212. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at vi.  
 213. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 60 (providing that the mean age of 
children in three states’ DR systems studied ranged from 5.4 years to 6.4 years).  
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ently learned a scary lesson from the prior history discussed above.214 
Research findings that seem laughable can have a very significant 
effect on policymakers. 
(c)   Parent Engagement Claims 
 The early advocacy research claims that parents are actually en-
gaged on the AR track more actively than parents on the TR track 
and thus that they receive more in the way of services that might 
reduce stress and help them avoid repeat maltreatment.215 There are 
a host of problems with this finding.  
 First, while the research refuses to discuss the dropout problem, it 
is clear that both the parent and worker surveys used to measure 
parent engagement are based on a highly selective, and by no means 
representative, sample of the whole AR group. The surveys are sent 
to only those parents who choose to engage in and complete the vol-
untary AR track program, and out of that group, only a small per-
centage responds to the survey.216 These parents are almost certainly 
those most invested in, and appreciative of, the program. By contrast, 
parent engagement for the TR group is measured for all parents on 
the track, including those who would much rather not be there. There 
is therefore no comparability between the two groups and no evidence 
as to the level of engagement of the entire group diverted to AR as 
compared to the group kept on the TR track. However, we know that 
somewhere in the vicinity of one-third to two-thirds of those in the AR 
group are not, in fact, engaged since they dropped out.217 
 Second, the services provided on the AR, as compared to the TR, 
track are significantly different. AR track services are primarily fi-
nancial benefits such as food or clothing, rent and utilities payments, 
and purchases of appliances and other household items, rather than 
the kinds of rehabilitative services designed to help unfit parents 
become fit like substance abuse treatment, anger management, and 
other parental fitness counseling. TR track services involve dispro-
portionately more in the way of such rehabilitative services.218 Even if 
the DR research were capable of proving that parents were more en-
gaged in AR services, this would say nothing about whether they 
were getting more in the way of services that were actually helpful in 
reducing child maltreatment. 
                                                                                                                                       
 214. See supra Part I. 
 215. See LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at x, 117; RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at v-vi. 
 216. E.g., LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 46; MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 
2, at 49.  
 217. See supra Part III.B.1.b.ii, infra Part IV.B.4.a.ii (discussing dropout rates in 
both Parts).  
 218. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 52-57 figs.5.1 & 5.2.  
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 Third, much of the research compares AR programs that have 
been given new funding for services and staff to TR programs that 
have received no new funding.219 A related issue characterizing virtu-
ally all of the research reports is that the social workers on the AR 
track have been given special training and directions not provided to 
the TR track workers.220 
 A comparison between tracks with different levels of funding and 
different types of training for staff and services proves absolutely noth-
ing about whether a voluntary track would work better than a poten-
tially coercive track in engaging parents and preventing maltreatment.  
(d)   Child Safety Claims 
 The early advocacy research claims that child safety is served as 
well or better on the AR track as on the TR track, generally relying 
primarily on comparative rates of re-reporting of child maltreatment. 
The research says that for AR families, these rates are roughly the 
same as, and in some cases lower than, the rates for CPS families.221  
 There are many problems with these safety claims. Most im-
portant is that there is no real focus on assessing the obvious risks of 
DR by social scientists free from bias,222 so there is no way to tell 
what might have surfaced if there had been such a focus.  
 In addition, many flaws in the safety claims are obvious. First, the 
reports imply, but do not actually make clear, that re-report rates for 
dropouts are included in the total rates for the AR group. Obviously, 
if they are not, then the re-report comparisons are close to meaning-
less, since as discussed above, the dropouts are likely the highest-risk 
group for repeat maltreatment.223  
                                                                                                                                       
 219. So, for example, in the early, influential Minnesota study, new foundation funds 
for services were made available to families on the AR but not the TR track. Id. at 19, 66. 
The 2010 Ohio study reports that $1000 per family was provided on the AR, but not the 
TR, track, crediting Casey Family Programs together with the Ohio Child Welfare De-
partment for the new funding. LOMAN ET AL., supra note 132, at 15. The 2011 New York 
DR research report notes that extra funds were provided to families on the AR track. 
RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 17; see also Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 510-13 (review-
ing the reports from Minnesota, Ohio, Nevada, and New York in Appendix A). The Final 
QIC-DR Report notes that in the later Ohio study, extra funds were provided to the AR 
track by both Casey and the QIC-DR grant. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 83. 
Casey’s DR Implementation Kit notes that “flexible funds” are generally provided to AR 
tracks and are essential to the system. GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 49, 50. 
 220. See, e.g., RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at iv (discussing the training provided to AR 
track social workers). 
 221. See, e.g., Puckett, supra note 1 (claiming slightly reduced re-report rates in AR 
families). 
 222. See discussion supra Part IV., including IV.A., B.1.a.   
 223. Tony Loman stated that his research did include the dropout re-report rates. 
Telephone Interview with Tony Loman, supra note 139.  
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 Second, even if dropouts were included in AR re-report totals, 
there is no reason to think that re-report rates reflect actual mal-
treatment rates for the dropout group in the same way that they re-
flect such rates for the AR participant group or the TR group, and 
there is no discussion of this issue. There is good reason to think they 
do not. There is a well-known and oft-discussed “surveillance bias” 
phenomenon.224 Families visited on a regular basis by social workers 
are more likely to be reported because these workers are mandated 
reporters.225 Families receiving services are more likely to be con-
nected with community resources with their own mandated report-
ers.226 Families on the AR track who refuse services from the get-go 
will be free from this kind of surveillance, and families who drop out 
along the way will be relatively free.  
 Third, there is also no reason to think that re-reports accurately 
capture any differences in actual maltreatment between those who 
receive services on the AR track and those on the TR track, and there 
is no discussion of this issue. Again, there is good reason to think 
they do not. The point of the AR track is to be parent-friendly and not 
engage in the type of monitoring and surveillance designed to identi-
fy maltreatment that is more characteristic of the TR track. The 
workers on the two tracks are differently trained and socialized, and 
they operate from different perspectives about their roles. According-
ly, AR workers seem less likely to report for maltreatment parents 
with whom they engage than TR workers are to report parents en-
gaging in similar maltreatment. 
 Fourth, the absence of any fact-finding investigation on the AR 
track, any findings about prior abuse and neglect, and any listing on 
maltreatment perpetrator registries will likely reduce the rate at 
which actual maltreatment is identified in the entire group diverted 
to AR, both dropouts and participants. Maltreatment findings are an 
important part of what social workers rely on in deciding whether to 
conclude that additional maltreatment has occurred and whether to 
report. Children on the AR track are less likely to be re-reported for 
maltreatment, as compared with children on the TR track, since their 
cases will be missing the information about prior incidents that 
would exist for similar cases on the TR track. 
 In addition to the suspect reliance on re-report rates, the research 
relies on social worker perceptions of family safety as an important 
measure of actual safety in comparing AR families to TR families.227 
                                                                                                                                       
 224. Conley & Berrick, supra note 101, at 289. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 286.  
 227. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 105-14; LOMAN ET AL., supra note 132, at 130-
33, figs.11.2 & 11.3.  
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There are many obvious problems with this measure. Among these 
are first, the likely bias of the workers who self-select for the AR 
track and are trained in ways designed to make sure they are true 
believers. Second, the worker assessments are based on the parents 
who have volunteered to participate to the end of the services period, 
at which point the only families left will be those that are most en-
thusiastic about the program and likely to be the lowest-risk families 
in the AR pool. 
 Finally, the research almost entirely ignores the huge safety risk 
posed to children as evidenced by the very high re-report rates char-
acterizing both the AR and TR tracks. It mentions these rates, at 
best, only in passing, so that the normal reader would not even no-
tice. But the problematic facts appear incidentally in at least some of 
the reports. As discussed above in section III.B.1.a.iii, re-report rates 
for AR families range from one-third to two-thirds, depending on the 
length of the follow-up period.  For example, the 2004 Minnesota Re-
port says the overall re-report rate is about one in three families dur-
ing a relatively short tracking period of two to three years.228 It pre-
dicts that long-term rates would rise to something like the general 
CPS recurrence rate of 65%.229 So claims of DR’s success are based on 
a prediction that children on the AR track will be likely to be re-
reported for maltreatment at something at least close to a two-thirds 
rate! We have to assume that actual safety risks are even higher than 
these re-report rates suggest, since re-reports significantly underes-
timate maltreatment.230  
 The overall high re-report rate deserves center stage in any report 
truly focused on child safety and well-being. The overwhelming ma-
jority of children kept at home, whether on the AR or TR track, suffer 
repeated abuse and neglect. This is no surprise given that we have 
known for years that children once victimized by maltreatment are 
highly likely to be re-victimized.231 But it calls out for comparing how 
children might do in a CPS reform program that moves in the oppo-
site direction from DR, providing more rather than less in the way of 
                                                                                                                                       
 228. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 141-42. 
 229. Id. A recent Loman and Siegel Ohio study reveals that nearly half of the families 
in the combined group of AR and TR cases had one or more screened-in re-reports. Lo-
man & Siegel, supra note 60, at 93. 
 230. See, e.g., IOM/NRC 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 205-06 (noting the critical 
need for studies that do not rely on re-report rates in assessing child safety); see KOHL, 
supra note 29, at 3 (stating that recurrent maltreatment is underreported based on 
comparisons with self-reports); KOHL, supra note 29, at 5, 6, 8, 31 (noting very signifi-
cant underreporting of maltreatment, including severely violent and neglectful parent-
ing, citing her own study and previous research); Kyte et al., supra note 50, at 126, 131; 
discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 231. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
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intervention, more monitoring, more rehabilitative treatment, and 
readier removal in response to serious abuse and neglect. 
(e)   Cost-Savings Claims 
 The early advocacy research reports typically end with sections 
assessing DR costs and benefits.232 Again, the focus is one which large-
ly ignores child interests.  It also ignores long-term costs to the state.  
 The reports indicate that in the early years of DR programs the 
costs of the AR track are often greater than those of the TR track.  
But they claim that the DR system will be likely to reduce financial 
costs in later years. This claim is based almost entirely on anticipat-
ed reductions in removal to foster care associated with DR and, to a 
lesser degree, on reductions in other traditional CPS activities like 
investigations.233  
 But the reports simply assume that eliminating investigations and 
reducing foster care are good things, with no analysis whatsoever of 
whether it serves or disserves child interests. As discussed above,234 
good social science provides reason to think that, as a general matter, 
reducing the rate of removal to foster care will be harmful to chil-
dren, putting them at greater risk for additional maltreatment and 
related problems. And to the extent that DR increases these long-
term risks to children, it will prove enormously costly to society in 
financial terms.235 
2.   The Independent Research 
 Relatively few studies out of the entire body of DR research can be 
characterized as independent from the DR movement and free from 
the advocacy spirit animating the research described above. But all of 
these independent research studies have a very different character 
and message from the advocacy research. 
 Amy Conley’s and Jill Duerr Berrick’s 2010 California DR Re-
port236 is filled with important cautions. They note that taking to-
gether all of the DR research done to date, the findings are “equivo-
cal”237 by contrast to the success story claimed in the advocacy re-
search. They point out that while DR systems are supposed to divert 
only low-risk cases to the AR track, they in fact regularly divert 
many “high-risk” and “very-high-risk” cases,238 with almost half of the 
                                                                                                                                       
 232. See, e.g., LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 158-66. 
 233. LOMAN ET AL., supra note 132, at 154.  
 234. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 235. See discussion infra Part V.B; see also infra text accompanying note 350.   
 236. Conley & Berrick, supra note 101. 
 237. Id. at 283.  
 238. Id. at 283, 289. 
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cases in their own studies falling in these categories. They note that 
many DR approaches gaining support across the country “offer little 
more than referrals to community resources.”239 They flag the dropout 
issue, noting that “more than half of the families who were of-
fered . . . [AR] services did not opt to participate in the program.”240 
They point out that this dropout problem limits the relevance of com-
parisons between AR and TR groups.241 And they note the high re-
report rate characterizing both AR and TR track families—roughly 
one-third—with re-reports occurring sooner in the AR group.242 
 Conley and Berrick conclude with a stunningly different overall 
assessment of DR’s “success” from that of the advocacy research.  
They find that while DR may provide families needed support, there 
is no reason to think it is useful in reducing child maltreatment.243 
 Some recent state research reports question the success of their 
own states’ DR programs. The Wyoming Legislative Service Office 
includes in its 2008 report’s “principal findings” that DR is “not effec-
tive in reducing families’ severity of contacts” and that families on 
the voluntary track “rarely accepted services and their problems of-
ten worsened.”244 It recommends that CPS “evaluate how to make the 
track system effective or seek its repeal.”245 It finds that the tradi-
tional CPS response is more successful than the AR approach in im-
proving child welfare.246 It concludes that the AR system “is not im-
proving families’ lots, and worse, that it may very well leave children 
in chronic low-level maltreatment situations until their predicaments 
worsen to the investigation level.”247 
 The Virginia Department of Social Service’s 2008 evaluation of 
DR, conducted with the assistance of Virginia Tech, finds serious 
problems.248 It notes that the majority of AR cases—54%—are high or 
moderate risk.249 It finds that AR families are less likely to accept 
services than TR families.250 
                                                                                                                                       
 239. Id. at 290. 
 240. Id. (emphasis added). 
 241. Id. at 289 (indicating that there is no way to know that those who continued in the 
program were similar to those who dropped out since “[c]lients who were more troubled 
may have been more likely to opt for treatment, or alternatively, clients who were better 
prepared to change their parenting may have chosen to participate” (emphasis added)). 
 242. Id. at 286. 
 243. Id. at 290. 
 244. MGMT. AUDIT COMM., supra note 130; see also id. at 21-22.  
 245. Id. at Executive Summary. 
 246. Id. at 24-25. 
 247. Id. at 30. 
 248. EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE SYSTEM, supra note 57.  
 249. Id. at 14. 
 250. Id. at 24.  
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 The highly respected Institute of Medicine and National Research 
Council (IOM/NRC) issued a Research Workshop Summary in 2012 
designed to sum up important child maltreatment research as a pre-
liminary step to revising the IOM’s 1993 Maltreatment Research 
Report.251 It states that the DR research studies “have not been able 
to rule out the possibility that increased harm might occur.”252 It cites 
important questions raised by its consultant Richard Barth, Dean of 
the School of Social Work at the University of Maryland, including: 
(1) whether the early research findings would be vindicated by “more 
rigorous evaluation designs,” and (2) why so few cases were being 
switched from AR to TR tracks based on safety concerns.253  
 In 2014, the IOM/NRC Final Report was published.254 The Report 
notes that the number of rigorous evaluations is low and that more 
rigorous evaluations are needed.255 (It specifies that just three ran-
domized, controlled trials, and seven quasi-experimental studies, had 
been conducted.)256 And it emphasizes: “Perhaps most critically, there 
is a need for studies that do not rely solely on administrative [re-
report] data.”257 It questions whether re-report rates on the AR track 
provide any meaningful measure of child safety: 
Because this finding is based on administrative data rather than di-
rect measures of safety . . . it must be interpreted carefully, because 
the differential response process could plausibly result in less in-
volvement of any agency with the children, who could then be less 
likely to be rereported even though they were being reabused.258 
 Deborah Daro and Kenneth Dodge conducted a comprehensive 
review of DR programs in a 2009 publication, finding “few positive 
effects on the initiative’s four core outcomes—child safety, parental 
capacity and access to support, child welfare agency and network 
efficiency, and community responsibility for child protection . . . .”259 
                                                                                                                                       
 251. OLSON & STROUD, supra note 3, at 1-4.  
 252. Id. at 86. 
 253. Id. at 87. 
 254. IOM/NRC 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
 255. Id. at 206.  
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3.   Hughes and Rycus Analysis of the Early Advocacy Research 
 The 2013 Hughes and Rycus article makes an enormous contribu-
tion to the DR debate.260 It was written from within the child welfare 
research world by highly respected scholars who have held, and who 
continue to hold, high-level positions with important organizations in 
the area of child maltreatment research. Ronald Hughes and Judith 
Rycus, the lead authors, serve as executive director and program 
director, respectively, of the North American Resource Center for 
Child Welfare, Institute for Human Services (IHS/NARCCW).261 
Hughes also served as the president of APSAC and serves as its on-
going president emeritus.262  
 The IHS/NARCCW initiated in early 2010 a comprehensive re-
search and literature review to address the organization’s developing 
concerns with DR implementation and evaluation, including concerns 
about child safety.  This resulted in publication of the Hughes and 
Rycus co-authored article in 2013, 263 which triggered immediate at-
tention. The editor of Research on Social Work Practice devoted the 
entire September 2013 issue to this article, related reaction papers, 
and a response to those papers by Hughes and Rycus.264 
 The Hughes and Rycus analysis provides a devastating critique 
that includes the following key elements. First, it questions the 
methodology of the DR advocacy research on multiple grounds, in-
cluding the fact that experimental AR and control TR samples were 
not comparable and concludes: 
To claim or imply that an intervention being evaluated is respon-
sible for observed outcomes without fully considering the poten-
tial role of . . . other variables can provide a distorted and exag-
gerated picture of the state of our knowledge about an interven-
tion’s effectiveness.  
 . . . . It is concerning that in most of the studies we reviewed, 
the claims presented in the research reports frequently over-
reached what might have legitimately been concluded, considering 
their many methodological limitations.265 
                                                                                                                                       
 260. See generally Hughes et al., supra note 6. 
 261. Staff, N. AM. RES. CTR. FOR CHILD WELFARE, http://www.ihs-trainet.com/ 
about/staff.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8YX4-3QPR.  
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 Second, they challenge the centrally important safety claim made 
by DR advocates—that DR does not put children at risk. They find—
based on an extensive analysis of the nature of DR and of the re-
search—both reason for concern about safety and inadequate evi-
dence alleviating that concern.266 They point to the many reasons 
why re-report rates and worker assessments of family safety provide 
inadequate measures of comparative child safety on the two tracks, 
summarizing: “[I]t is not possible to conclude that a DR model exists 
that can ensure that children’s safety is not compromised in alterna-
tive tracks.”267 
 Third, the article condemns the research as promotion masked as 
science: 
[W]e found unsupported, inflated, and unfounded promotional 
claims to be a significant problem in the differential response . . . 
research we reviewed. . . . [M]any of the studies . . . failed to fully 
articulate and explain study limitations and often failed to propose 
alternative explanations for study findings, thus increasing the 
likelihood that readers would draw erroneous conclusions not sup-
ported by the data. Many claims in this body of literature about 
the benefits of DR exemplify marketing and promotional strategies 
rather than objective science.  
. . . . 
 This type of promotion has no place in outcome research. The 
scientific and ethical foundations of outcome research, its empiri-
cal and ethical legitimacy, and its practical utility are all under-
mined or discounted by promotional strategies other than the ac-
curate, objective, and transparent demonstration of evidence.268 
Several leading experts and organizations within the child welfare 
field provided important support for Hughes’s and Rycus’s conclu-
sions. Viola Vaughan-Eden and Frank Vandervort, then president 
and president-elect, respectively, of the APSAC,269 describe the 
Hughes and Rycus article as perhaps “the most important article in 
the child welfare arena in the past 15 years.”270 They question “how a 
program with so little empirical support gained such favor . . . in this 
                                                                                                                                       
 266. Id. at 500-04. 
 267. Id. at 504. 
 268. Id. app.B, at 516. 
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era of evidence-based practice.”271 Their own explanation is the “un-
holy alliance” between left and right political forces,272 noting that 
just such an alliance partnered to enact the first DR legislation in 
Missouri in 1994.273 They also point to the role played by “politically 
connected private foundations,” warning how that “can distort re-
search designs, findings, and assertions about the efficacy of pro-
gramming in the field of child welfare.”274 Finally, they call for a 
moratorium on the use of DR until it has been “rigorously and hon-
estly studied,” warning that failure to do so will put children at un-
due risk.275 
 Christopher Baird co-authored an article on behalf of the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency and the Children’s Research Cen-
ter, both important organizations in the child welfare and related 
research fields.276 This article notes that Hughes and Rycus are “in-
ternationally known experts with extensive experience in policy and 
program development, much of which was designed to improve prac-
tice through family engagement techniques[]. . . [and who] have also 
championed the application of research findings and evidence-based 
programs to inform program development.”277 
 They praise the Hughes and Rycus paper for its “compelling cri-
tique” and its courage in taking on such a popular program.278 They 
join in questioning the DR research methodology, noting that with 
AR track programs receiving extra resources not provided to the TR 
track, “it would be surprising” if AR parents and staff did not find AR 
more responsive to family needs.279 They support the concerns with 
the accuracy of DR safety claims and warn of the need to be cautious 
about “creating cultures of ‘naïve practice’ in which workers focus 
solely on family strengths and protective capacities.”280 
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4.   The QIC-DR Research281 
 The DR movement planned the QIC-DR stage as the culminating 
research platform for mounting the final push for their hoped-for 
federal finance reform. The QIC-DR reports were to serve as the ul-
timate demonstration of the success of DR, providing a basis for fed-
eral government action diverting funding from traditional CPS pro-
grams to DR.282 In 2008, the U.S. Children’s Bureau provided a five-
year, multimillion-dollar grant in 2008283 to the AHA and its part-
ners, including the IAR.284  
 Three state programs were chosen for study in Illinois, Colorado, 
and Ohio. The final state research reports were published in late 
2013 and early 2014, and the Final Cross-Site Report, designed to 
compare and summarize the evidence from the three state program 
studies, was published in July 2014.285 
 The reports reveal troubling evidence of the danger that DR poses 
for children, which is discussed below.286 However, despite this evi-
dence, the reports read like success stories yet again. Indeed, the claim 
is now made that DR is ready not simply for dramatic expansion 
across the nation for the low-risk cases for which it was supposedly 
designed. The reports argue that the case has been made for expansion 
to high-risk cases! This conclusion is, of course, consistent with the 
Casey Family Programs goal of eliminating foster care altogether. 
 Thus the Ohio Final Report concludes, based on no comprehensi-
ble reasoning, that AR “may be effective among somewhat higher-
risk cases.”287 The Colorado Final Report similarly argues for consid-
ering expansion of DR to high-risk cases without any apparent basis 
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in evidence.288 This is especially interesting in light of the fact that 
DR in Colorado was triggered by a series of high-profile child fatali-
ties in 2007.289 Such fatalities might be thought indicative of the need 
for more intensive intervention by CPS to monitor and consider re-
moval of children; however, they were used instead to justify the in-
stitution of DR for low-risk cases, which is now alleged to be appro-
priate for high-risk cases. 
 The Final QIC-DR Cross-Site Report makes clear the general ab-
sence of evidence in the three QIC-DR state studies that AR works 
particularly well in any respect, even in terms of pleasing parents.290 
Nonetheless, the Report ends by making claims that the studies have 
implications for widespread changes in traditional systems in the DR 
direction. Thus, the report raises questions as to whether “jurisdic-
tions wish to consider that all families who are referred to CPS would 
be eligible for AR[,]”291 whether higher-risk cases should be included 
in AR, and whether CPS workers should have the discretion to reas-
sign TR families to AR.292 It makes the connection with federal fi-
nance reform, noting that reducing foster care placements and using 
Title IV-E waivers may be the way to fund DR.293 And finally, the 
Report indicates that DR may lead the way to fundamental change of 
the entire CPS system, so that CPS itself becomes an agency largely 
devoted to linking even high-risk families on a voluntary basis to 
services, rather than identifying perpetrators who can be required to 
engage in rehabilitation programs and whose parental rights can be 
restricted.294  
 This movement to expand DR to virtually all CPS cases, including 
high-risk cases, is inconsistent with the reasoning on which DR was 
originally premised. And even some of DR’s most important support-
ers, Tony Loman and Gary Siegel, stated in a recent article that AR is 
inappropriate for high-risk cases, arguing based on their research that 
it should be targeted toward families without prior maltreatment re-
ports rather than toward chronic offenders or parents with “deeper 
and more intractable problems, such as mental illness, substance 
abuse, domestic violence or children that are difficult to care for, which 
often characterize families frequently encountered by CPS.”295  
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(a)   New Evidence of Safety Risks in Differential Response 
 The QIC-DR research provides powerful evidence of the risks that 
DR poses to children, however minimized those risks are by the au-
thors. This evidence appears in connection with the Illinois DR pro-
gram, which is interesting because Illinois diverted an unusually low 
percentage of cases to the AR track,296 presumably a much lower-risk 
group overall than the groups that are more typically diverted to AR. 
i.   High Re-Report Rates on the Voluntary Track 
 DR advocates have made the claim from the beginning that DR 
poses no additional risks to children, citing as primary evidence that 
re-report rates for families on the AR track were the same as, or low-
er than, rates for families on the TR track. But the Illinois QIC-DR 
research finds higher re-report rates for the AR track.297 Moreover, the 
difference in re-report risk increased over time,298 making it likely 
that the difference would be even greater a year or two out. 
 This is dramatic new news. One investigative journalist sums up 
the significance as follows: 
The long delayed release of an evaluation of Illinois’ differential re-
sponse program casts new doubts on whether one of the country’s 
most popular child welfare reforms is safe for children and a smart 
way to spend limited resources dedicated to families on the fringe. 
According to the report, children whose parents had benefitted 
from twice as much social work time, $400 stipends and a philoso-
phy that stresses family strengths were more likely to be reported 
for child maltreatment and become victims of substantiated abuse 
or neglect. 
This controverts 20 years of evaluations and assurances that chil-
dren involved with . . . [DR] programs across the country were as 
safe or safer than children who received traditional child protec-
tive services.299 
 In addition, all three state that the QIC-DR studies found very 
high maltreatment re-report rates on both the AR and TR tracks, a 
fact that prior DR research revealed only in passing, if at all. The 
Ohio Final QIC-DR research reveals re-report rates of 37% for AR 
families and 36% for TR families.300 The Colorado Final QIC-DR re-
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search reveals re-report rates of 44% for AR families and 45% for TR 
families within a short year of the initial referral to CPS.301  
ii.   High Drop-Out Rates and Related Safety Risks on the 
Voluntary Track 
 The Illinois Final QIC-DR research finally provides evidence 
about the AR dropout population.302 The revelation of this infor-
mation seems motivated by the authors’ need to explain away the 
disturbing finding that AR re-report rates are higher than TR 
rates.303 One has to ask whether, had the authors of the earlier advo-
cacy research been willing to provide the dropout breakdown statis-
tics, we would have seen similarly disturbing evidence. In any event, 
the Illinois dropout statistics provide stunning new evidence of the 
risks inherent in DR.  
 First, of those originally allocated to the AR track, almost one in 
three drop out. Less than half of those originally diverted to AR com-
plete the program. (The additional one-sixth is transferred to DR, 
because their cases are re-assessed as high risk.) Those withdrawing 
after first starting down the AR track have the highest re-report rates 
of all. Those on the TR track have the lowest re-report rates of all. For 
substantiated re-reports, the findings are similar, with AR withdraw-
ers having the highest re-report rates and the TR rates coming in close 
to the bottom of the various AR and TR groups.304  
 These data on dropout re-report rates—the first provided over 
many years of this advocacy research—are stunningly negative for DR 
proponents. The fact that those who participate and then drop off the 
AR track have the highest re-report rates of all groups raises powerful 
questions about the success of DR programs in assessing risk for pur-
poses of assigning children to AR, the success of AR services in ad-
dressing maltreatment problems, and the risks for children of being 
on the AR track.  
 The fact that the overall dropout rate is close to one-third, count-
ing those refusing services from the outset, is similarly troubling. DR 
is justified in large part as a way of providing services that allegedly 
are not being provided on the traditional CPS track. In Illinois, DR 
was supposed to respond in part to the fact that the state was not 
meeting federal requirements for providing services to children iden-
tified as victims of child maltreatment.305 But now we know that the 
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AR track also fails to provide services to a substantial proportion of 
all of its families. 
 The fact that less than half of the original AR track families end 
up completing AR services also calls into question all aspects of the 
DR research over the years based on parent and worker surveys, 
since these surveys are based on only a small sample of those who 
complete AR services.306 
 A final, supremely interesting fact revealed by the breakdown is 
that parents refusing AR services from the get-go have next to the low-
est re-report rates and the lowest substantiated re-report rates.307 This 
puzzling fact is left totally unexplored by the Illinois Report. Interest-
ingly, the authors make no claim that this represents the actual mal-
treatment rate for this population. Indeed, it would be problematic 
for DR proponents to assert that the families who do best of all are 
those left totally free from the supposed benefits of AR services.  
 But it is important to ask why these re-report rates for the early 
dropouts are so low, now that we finally have this breakdown. It 
seems likely that this low re-report rate is simply not an accurate 
reflection of the actual repeat maltreatment rate—that maltreatment 
that occurs among families who refuse ever to participate in AR is 
not being captured by official reports in the same way it is captured 
for other AR and TR families. As discussed above, this group is free 
from the kind of surveillance characterizing participants on both AR 
and TR tracks, surveillance that is more likely to trigger reports.308  
 If the low re-report rate for early dropouts has no real relation-
ship to actual maltreatment rates, then all of the DR claims regard-
ing child safety based on re-report rates made over the years are 
questionable. 
(b)   Continuation of the Advocacy Research Mode 
 The QIC-DR research program promised to “rigorously study im-
plementation, outcomes, and cost impact of DR.”309 Given the power-
ful attack by Hughes and Rycus on the earlier advocacy research and 
the explosive debate reflected in the Research on Social Work Prac-
tice special issue, one might have hoped that those in charge of the 
QIC-DR program would have consulted broadly to come up with a 
new research team, a new set of research questions, and a new re-
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search design. Instead, the research leadership team involves the 
same people and organizations central in the early advocacy research 
and, not surprisingly, has largely replicated that research approach. 
Only one of the three Final Reports even refers to the Hughes and 
Rycus article.310 The Final Cross-Site Report makes no mention of it.  
 This QIC-DR leadership team is responsible both for promoting 
and developing the DR model across the United States and for the 
research that is supposed to assess the value of that model.311 This 
represents the same troublesome merger of advocacy and research 
roles that has plagued DR from the beginning. 
 Loman and Siegel, along with the IAR, are credited in the QIC-DR 
reports as consultants and for contributing their research design.312 
While they did not actually author the reports, their influence in the 
design and implementation of the research is apparent. The QIC-DR 
reports largely track the topics and organization of the earlier IAR 
reports and reflect a similar methodology. Casey Family Foundation 
staff members are acknowledged as advisors.313 
 Most of the troubling features of the earlier research are replicated. 
So, for example, new funding is provided for services on the AR, but 
not the TR, track;314 and AR staff are specially selected and trained.315 
Comparisons are then made between AR and TR tracks, and claims 
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IR workers in both Ohio and Illinois expressed some frustration with the unequal access to 
funds for the families they serve”); see also MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 83 (discuss-
ing funds from QIC-DR grant and Casey Family Programs).  
 315. BROWN ET AL., supra note 67, at 25-30; see MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 39-
54, 132.  
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for AR success are made, with limited acknowledgement that any 
such success might be due simply to the differences in funding and 
staffing. Indeed, in Illinois, an increased caseload size for the TR 
workers based on the DR program was reported.316 And in all three 
states, workers reported workload inequities,317 with TR track work-
ers in Illinois saying that they were limited in their ability to provide 
services by high caseloads and time limitations.318  
 There is the same troubling difference in types of services provided, 
with a greater emphasis on the AR track on financial support and a 
greater emphasis on the TR track on rehabilitative treatment.319 In 
the Illinois system, for example, cash assistance of up to $400 was 
available to AR parents,320 in addition to other supportive services 
including: “car repair or transportation; housing assistance; food or 
clothing; appliances, furniture, or home repairs; help paying utilities; 
welfare/public assistance services; medical or dental care; other fi-
nancial help; . . . cooking [and] cleaning . . . .”321 The Illinois Report 
characterizes AR services as “especially poverty-related.”322 TR ser-
vices were more likely to include counseling, domestic violence ser-
vices, parenting skills and related training, substance abuse treat-
ment, and help getting mental health services.323 As with earlier DR 
advocacy research, there is no adequate discussion of how these dif-
ferences in services make comparisons between success on the differ-
ent tracks questionable and no discussion at all of whether shifting 
the emphasis so significantly from rehabilitative to financial support 
services is helpful in protecting children.  
 There is the same use of cost savings as supposed evidence of suc-
cess when it is, of course, predictable that eliminating investigations 
and reducing the use of foster care would reduce costs. 324 There is the 
                                                                                                                                       
 316. BROWN ET AL., supra note 67, at 30. The Illinois Report is guilty of an outrageous 
additional apples and oranges comparison that proves nothing regarding the alleged differ-
ences in the level of services provided on the two tracks. The Report first claims that the 
AR track provides more services than the TR track, only to later admit that the comparison 
is based on a period of time when the AR workers are supposed to be providing services but 
when the TR workers are supposed to be simply investigating, with the TR system de-
signed to provide services at a later stage of the TR process. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR 
IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 61, 82 n.30.  
 317. BROWN ET AL., supra note 67, at 35. 
 318. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 59.  
 319. See MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7, 85 tbl.7.2, 119.  
 320. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
 321. Id. at 4, 53; see also MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 85 tbl.4.7, n.52 (providing a 
similar list of AR services).  
 322. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. 
 323. Id. at 53-56 tbl.5, figs. 20 & 21; MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7; 
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 83 tbl.4.6; WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 79.  
 324. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 85 (noting cost savings 
due to investigations and child removals on TR track); MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 
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same failure to seriously engage with whether such financial savings 
come at the cost of increased maltreatment of children.  
 There is the same advocacy tone. For example, the Ohio QIC-DR 
Final Report’s introductory chapter ends with this statement of what 
is to come: “[W]e describe in more detail how AR is perceived as effec-
tive in terms of implementation, practice, and outcomes.”325  
 There is the same glossing over of problematic issues indicating 
risks for children and the same rosy “read” of the evidence to produce 
an enthusiastic success story. As discussed above,326 the Illinois QIC-
DR Report reveals disturbing new evidence that DR poses risks to 
children, showing that parents on the AR track have higher re-report 
rates than TR track children, that AR track parents drop out at ex-
tremely high rates, and that AR parents who drop out have the high-
est re-report rates of all groups assessed. However, the Illinois Re-
port’s concluding chapter portrays DR as a shining success: 
 One of the most consistent findings to emerge from the Illinois 
DR evaluation is that parents who received DR felt more strongly 
positive about all aspects of their child protective services experi-
ence when compared to parents who received an investiga-
tion. . . . [A] significantly greater percentage of parents who re-
ceived DR had more positive emotional responses and fewer nega-
tive ones, were more highly engaged, and were more highly satis-
fied with their worker and the services they received.327 
It sums up safety issues, stating that “[t]he totality of all available 
evidence from . . . [the] six rigorous [randomized controlled trial stud-
ies to date] seems to indicate that children who receive DR are at 
least as safe as those who receive an investigation.”328 This statement 
conveniently avoids reference to the Illinois Report’s own devastating 
conclusions regarding child safety in the Illinois DR program.329 In an 
interview, the lead researcher for this Illinois study confessed that 
while their research found that “ ‘families like it better . . . [and that 
                                                                                                                                       
2, at 8, 106; MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 125 (containing a small sample that indi-
cated limited cost savings with the DR program, which was primarily attributable to foster 
care reduction).  
 325. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 12.  
 326. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.a. 
 327. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 91. 
 328. Id. at 92. 
 329. See supra Part IV.B.4.a. See also WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 71-75, 110 
(massaging the Colorado QIC-DR report evidence to find positive safety implications). The 
Report claims that the “lack of a statistically significant finding for the short-term safety 
outcomes was not surprising given that the DR system reform also enhanced traditional 
CPS practices” with scant evidence of the latter. WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 110. It 
claims that “[t]he most promising finding was that there may be long-term child safety 
benefits and cost savings due to lower levels of re-involvement, over time” for AR families. 
This is based solely on the iffy “survival analysis” which purports to predict, in the absence of 
referrals actually observed during the study period, what future referrals will take place. Id.  
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i]n that sense it works fine. If you look at safety you may have a dif-
ferent answer.’ ”330 Nonetheless, she concluded that DR was “a prom-
ising practice.”331 
 The Final Cross-Site QIC-DR Report notes that Illinois broke 
down the groups on the AR track for the first time, but then fails to 
provide any information whatsoever about the troubling evidence of 
safety issues that the breakdown revealed, including the evidence 
that AR dropouts had the highest re-report rates of all groups.332 In-
stead, the Cross-Site Report simply refers the reader to an appendix 
that was unpublished and thus unavailable on the website at the 
time of the Report’s online publication!333 
 There is the same troubling emphasis on parent satisfaction and 
parent perceptions of their own engagement as measures of suc-
cess.334 But prior research problems are now topped by the use of par-
ent views to make safety claims. Thus, parent perceptions of child 
safety and family well-being are used as key indicators of the all-
important child safety findings.335 All of the problems discussed 
above336 plague this attempt to use parent views as proving anything 
other than the completely unsurprising conclusion that the relative 
handful of parents who choose to fill out the survey, among the al-
ready limited group sticking with the voluntary program to the end, 
are prepared to say they think it has helped them, and that they re-
port feeling more positive about the program than parents on the TR 
track who, of course, may not like the fact that they are subject to 
investigations, monitoring, and the threat of further intervention 
based on repeated child maltreatment. Using these parent percep-
tions as evidence of child safety seems an obviously desperate move, 
triggered perhaps by the absence of other helpful evidence. 
 In addition, removal to foster care is now used as an important 
supposed measure of child safety.337 The fact that somewhat greater 
                                                                                                                                       
 330. Heimpel, supra note 7 (quoting Tamara Fuller, Director of the University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign’s Center on Child Welfare Research). 
 331. Id. (quoting Tamara Fuller, Director of the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign’s Center on Child Welfare Research). 
 332. See supra Part IV.B.4.a.ii. 
 333. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 53-54, 123-24. 
 334. See, e.g., MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 132 (“[W]hile AR did not result in 
higher levels of family satisfaction, AR families did report being more likely to contact their 
worker in the future, being better off and better parents because of their experience with 
the agency, and report higher levels of engagement in the case work process.”).  
 335. See, e.g., FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at v (Table of 
Contents chapter 6,  “Child Safety and Family Well-Being,” listing the following after “6.5 
Child Removals:” “6.6 Parent Perceptions of Child Safety” and “6.7 Parent Perceptions of 
Family Well-Being”); WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at vi, 76 (using parent perceptions to 
measure child safety and family well-being).  
 336. Supra Parts IV.B.1.b, IV.B.1.c.  
 337. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 115-16.  
2015]  DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE 635 
 
 
use has been made of foster care to date on the TR track, with more 
also predicted for the future, is used to claim that children are less at 
risk on the AR track, with no discussion as to why this measure should 
count as a proxy for child safety. Given that the whole point of AR is to 
reduce the use of more intensive and intrusive methods of child protec-
tion, the reduced use of foster care is no surprise. Obviously, one could 
predict a reduction in such use. The big question that DR poses, 
though, is whether such reduction helps or hurts children. There are 
many reasons to think that foster care removal generally serves to 
protect children.338 This is part of why questions have been raised from 
the beginning as to whether DR puts children at undue risk. These DR 
reports simply ignore all of the obvious problems with using this as a 
measure of success and claim, case proven!339 
V.   THE UNDERLYING POLITICS: WHY THE RESISTANCE TO CHILD-
FRIENDLY CHILD WELFARE POLICIES? 
 Why this DR Movement? Why has it gained such traction given all 
of the obvious risks to children and flaws in the research? Why this 
succession of extreme family preservation movements with similar 
characteristics? Understanding all of this is key to making the future 
of child welfare different. 
 The real reasons for these policies must be different from the rea-
sons given. Those given are too obviously questionable, and the re-
search cited in support of these policies is too obviously flawed. So, 
for example, with IFPS, it is hard to believe that those promoting 
these policies really thought child abuse was typically just a six-week 
crisis that could be solved with social worker support and house 
cleaning. With Racial Disproportionality, it is hard to believe that 
those promoting the racial bias theory really thought blacks could 
just overcome through their unique family strengths the poverty and 
related conditions that predicted child maltreatment for other 
groups. And now with DR, it is hard to believe that the proponents 
really think parents who suffer from substance abuse, mental illness, 
and other serious dysfunction characterizing those responsible for 
child maltreatment will magically become nurturing parents simply 
because parent-friendly social workers hand them rent payments.  
                                                                                                                                       
 338. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 339. When asked about this problem in the research, Tony Loman said that no re-
search studies were contemplated assessing whether the children kept at home pursuant to 
DR were, in fact, better or worse off than the children removed to foster care. Telephone 
Interview with Tony Loman, supra note 139. The 2013 QIC-DR Ohio Report does concede 
that higher removal rates might relate to a greater concern by TR investigators with child 
safety, but it argues that the DR research suggests that vigilance regarding safety is not 
relaxed under AR. They concede that the reasons for the differences in removal rates might 
be examined in research. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 48-49. 
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 Some would say that family preservation simply reflects deeply 
held values about family privacy in our society.340 We value individu-
al autonomy in ways that few other nations do, and this is reflected 
in constitutional and other policies protecting the family against 
state intervention.341 
 But family privacy is not always sacrosanct. Women’s rights advo-
cates fought the idea of family privacy when they saw women victim-
ized by domestic violence and felt the need for protective intervention 
by the state.342 They fought the idea that relationships in which 
women were victimized were the kinds of families that deserved 
preservation.343 And they have achieved dramatic changes in policy 
over recent decades, expanding state intervention with the goal of 
liberating women from families that do not function the way families 
should. 
 Why have children not been seen as entitled to similar liberation? 
A.   Children Have No Rights 
 Unlike women, children have no rights. This is true in the literal 
sense that they—especially the most vulnerable among them—
cannot speak for themselves, demonstrate on the streets, vote, get 
themselves elected to office or appointed as judges, and do the other 
things that adults do both in expressing their rights and in pushing 
for the establishment of additional rights. 
 As a formal legal matter, children have no rights to nurturing 
parents under federal or state constitutional law. By contrast, par-
ents have powerful constitutional rights to hold onto and raise their 
children free from undue state intervention. This constitutional 
framework both reflects our societal values and helps to shape our 
entire CPS system.344 It makes extreme family preservation policies 
seem right and just. 
 The rest of the world thinks of children as having rights, at least 
as a formal matter. Virtually all other countries have ratified the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which accords children 
equal status with adults as rights holders. Under the CRC, children 
                                                                                                                                       
 340. Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child 
Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1741-42 (2000) (reviewing BARTHOLET, supra note 1). 
 341. Id.  
 342. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 50-54. 
 343. Id. 
 344. For powerful challenges to this understanding of the traditional constitutional 
framing of child and parent rights, see James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The 
State, Parentage, and the Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755 (2009) [herein-
after Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright]; James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: 
States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407 
(2008) [hereinafter Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense]. 
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have rights to nurturing parents and rights to be protected against 
abuse and neglect. Under the CRC, nations have duties to protect 
children against maltreatment and to ensure that children receive 
appropriate nurturing.345 These aspects of the CRC are part of the 
explanation for why the United States has not ratified the CRC.346 
B.   The Left-Right Bargain: 
A Cheap Version of the War on Poverty347 
 Many of those advocating for extreme family preservation policies 
appear to be using children to promote an anti-poverty agenda. The 
children at risk for abuse and neglect are disproportionately the chil-
dren of the poor. Left-wing forces committed to helping poor people 
and historically oppressed racial minority groups often see efforts to 
intervene in families to protect children as yet another attack upon 
already victimized groups. They often see family preservation ser-
vices as providing at least some financial and other support for poor 
families in a society reluctant to provide enough support. 
 Family preservation programs do, as a general matter, provide 
financial stipends and related forms of support for a subset of poor 
families. If children identified as at risk for abuse and neglect are 
kept at home, or returned home from foster care, the parents often 
receive supportive services. IFPS programs offered housekeeping, 
childcare, transportation and other services, and many other family 
preservation programs offer similar assistance. DR programs pride 
themselves on providing financial support. 
 Right-wing forces often see family preservation policies as a way 
to reduce government and save money. Those promoting family 
preservation provide evidence and arguments to support the cost-
saving goal. And short term, these policies often do save money. 
Eliminating CPS jurisdiction over families eliminates the costs of 
social worker monitoring. Reducing foster care eliminates the cost of 
foster parent stipends as well as CPS administration. Most family 
preservation policies, including both IFPS and DR, have been sold in 
significant part on the basis of such cost-savings arguments.  
 But there are problems with this left-right bargain that should 
trouble people on both sides of the political spectrum. For the left, 
this is a pathetically limited anti-poverty strategy. Providing poor 
people and oppressed racial minority groups the limited financial 
                                                                                                                                       
 345. Elizabeth Bartholet, Ratification by the United States of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: Pros and Cons from a Child’s Rights Perspective, 633 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 80, 85-86, 91-94 (2011).  
 346. Id. at 87-88, 91-94.  
 347. For discussion of the left-right politics of child welfare, see BARTHOLET, supra note 
1, at 44-55, and also see GELLES, supra note 37, at 132-33.  
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subsidies available in these family preservation programs is no road 
to empowerment.  
 Moreover, if the best we can do today are limited poverty allevia-
tion efforts, it is wrong to choose one that comes at the expense of the 
most powerless subset of the poor—the children victimized by abuse 
and neglect. And it may ultimately be counter-productive: children so 
victimized are disproportionately likely to grow up impoverished 
themselves, and in the ranks of the homeless, the unemployed, and 
those addicted to drugs and alcohol.348 They are also disproportion-
ately likely to victimize their own children, thus continuing the vi-
cious cycle into future generations.349 
 It is also perverse to select that small subset of the poor who 
abuse and neglect their children as the beneficiaries of this limited 
anti-poverty campaign. Most poor people do their flat-out best to 
raise their children well, providing loving and nurturing care despite 
the oppressive conditions of their lives. Why should they be denied 
the financial benefits that abusive parents get in the form of family 
preservation services? 
 For the right, extreme family preservation policies may look 
cheap, but in the long run, they are very expensive. Children who are 
denied appropriate nurturing and who end up in disproportionate 
numbers on welfare, in prisons, and suffering emotional and physical 
disabilities are children who are very expensive in the long run.350 
C.   Private Wealth Dominance over Policy 
Advocacy and Research 
 For the past several decades, a small group of enormously wealthy 
and powerful organizations have dominated both policy and research 
in child welfare. From the 1980s through the 1990s, it was the Edna 
McConnell Foundation and the Annie E. Casey Foundation leading 
the charge on IFPS.351 More recently, it has been a combination of the 
Casey Foundations, primarily the Annie E. Casey and the Casey 
Family Programs Foundation, leading the charge on Racial Dispro-
portionality and DR.352 
 Research is desperately needed to guide policy. This is always 
true, given the difficulty of knowing how different policy ideas will 
play out in the real world. It is particularly true in child welfare giv-
                                                                                                                                       
 348. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 95-97. 
 349. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 96. 
 350. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 55; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1350 n.75.  
 351. See supra Part I.A. 
 352. See supra Introduction and Part I.B. 
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en the danger that policies purporting to serve child interests will 
actually be motivated by various adult interests. 
 It is extremely dangerous to have one set of wealthy, private play-
ers dominating both policy advocacy and research to the degree that 
they have.353 
VI.   FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 
A.   Children’s Rights 
 We need a radical upending of the rights hierarchy in this coun-
try, so that children are valued equally with adults and their most 
fundamental rights to grow up with nurturing parents are valued 
equally with adult rights to raise their children.354 
 Ratification by the United States of the CRC, or some other dra-
matic move to grant children equal status with adults as rights hold-
ers, would be a meaningful step forward in changing the dynamics of 
child welfare.355 
 But it would not by itself solve the problem. Even with formal 
rights, the fact that children are inherently powerless as compared to 
adults will make a huge difference. Adults like to think that they love 
and appreciate children, but there is always a risk that those with 
more power will exploit and oppress those with less. And there is al-
ways a risk that adults claiming to represent children will be using 
children to promote various adult agendas. We need to acknowledge 
the challenge of granting children truly equal recognition in law and 
policy and begin to design new ways of holding accountable the adults 
who in the end will still make so many decisions about children. 
B.   Maltreatment Prevention: Radical Social Reform, 
Early Supportive Intervention, and CPS Reform 
 The DR proponents are right to say that maltreatment is rooted in 
poverty and social injustice. They are right to say that we should 
focus more on early prevention of maltreatment. But they propose a 
solution that utterly fails to meet the mark. Providing rent stipends 
and other financial benefits to the tiny subset of the poor who mal-
treat their children is no empowerment strategy, nor will it do much 
to prevent maltreatment. 
                                                                                                                                       
 353. See Bartholet, supra note 23, at 880-90.  
 354. See generally Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright, supra note 344 (arguing that a 
child’s constitutional rights should be a paramount consideration when deciding the child’s 
parentage); Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense, supra note 344 (arguing that children 
should be protected from birth from unfit parents).  
 355. See Bartholet, supra note 345, at 84-94, 99.  
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 We need a true war on poverty of the kind that President Lyndon 
Johnson announced356 but that no president since has renewed. We 
need serious programs to address poverty and the conditions associ-
ated with poverty, including unemployment, substance abuse, mental 
illness, and blighted neighborhoods. 
 Critics of the earlier family preservation movements that preceded 
this DR movement noted that they also constituted cheap and, in the 
end, utterly inadequate attempts to address the issues of poverty and 
injustice underlying child maltreatment. They noted that we needed 
a far more radical engagement with these issues, a true war on pov-
erty. One of the authors of a landmark critique of IFPS, concluded in 
a later article that IFPS was doomed to failure because the problems 
producing child maltreatment were “rooted in poverty, unemploy-
ment, inadequate housing, substance abuse, and severe and persis-
tent mental illness.”357 My 2009 article on the Racial Disproportional-
ity movement argued that it was similarly misdirected, proposing a 
false solution that avoided the real problems and the need for truly 
radical social reform.358 
 While such reform is sadly not on the immediate horizon, there 
are programs that could make a major difference that would not re-
quire radical social changes or overwhelming financial commitments. 
We should embrace these. So, for example, we should expand the 
programs that target parents at risk for maltreatment early on, be-
fore they fall into the kind of dysfunction that breeds maltreatment. 
This is the stage at which we have evidence that prevention efforts 
have the best chance of working. There are at least a number of early 
home visitation programs with powerful evidence of success in reduc-
ing maltreatment and reducing important predictors for maltreat-
ment.359 We need to devote massively increased resources to these 
programs and to the development of other promising programs simi-
larly targeted to early prevention. 
 We also need to do some version of DR but within the framework 
of the traditional CPS system. For this, we need new resources de-
voted to CPS, since a large part of the reason that it provides so little 
in the way of services to the families on its caseload has to do with 
the inadequacy of resources. Additional resources are also needed to 
                                                                                                                                       
 356. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964). 
 357. Julia H. Littell, Effects of the Duration, Intensity, and Breadth of Family Preserva-
tion Services: A New Analysis of Data from the Illinois Family First Experiment, 19 
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 358. Bartholet, supra note 23, at 923; see also Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1341-42 n. 
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 359. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 165-68; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1346-50.  
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enable CPS to protect the children at highest risk through monitor-
ing, mandated rehabilitative programs for parents, removal to foster 
care, and adoption. 
 Resources will be hard to come by. Part of the allure of all family 
preservation proposals is that they promise to save money. But we 
cannot protect children adequately on the cheap. And we are not really 
saving state funds by allowing children to be abused and neglected. 
Many studies demonstrate the overwhelming long-term costs involved 
when children grow up in the absence of appropriate nurturing.360 
C.   Research Reform 
 Major challenges have been raised regarding the quality and per-
suasiveness of the research touting DR as a success story. An in-
creasing number of critics have given voice to their concerns both 
about the nature of the advocacy research and the substance of DR 
programs.361 This gives hope for better research in the future, provid-
ing a better guide to policymakers as to whether DR is the right di-
rection for child welfare reform or, instead, just the wrong direction. 
It gives hope for research making child welfare the primary focus and 
research, honestly assessing the risks of DR, and also comparing DR 
not simply to the current, inadequate CPS system, but also to a 
strengthened CPS system with enhanced power to protect children.  
 But even if this hope is realized and even if the DR movement is 
brought to a halt, fundamental change in the dynamics of child wel-
fare research is needed if history is not endlessly to repeat itself. We 
have now had many decades in which different forms of extreme fam-
ily preservation have been promoted, supported by research designed 
simply to vindicate the ideological view of those promoting the policy 
programs. While there is some excellent independent research in the 
child welfare field, there is not nearly enough, and often it takes 
years for this research to surface, years during which advocacy pro-
grams are propagated based on false claims of success.  
 The child welfare field needs a new tradition of truly independent, 
neutral research, free from any advocacy agenda and committed to 
finding the objective truth. We need new sources for research funding 
that have no commitment to predetermined policy directions. We 
need social scientists to be able to pursue the truth and to ask ques-
tions and come to conclusions that challenge orthodox thinking, free 
from fear of retribution, including limits on future research opportu-
nities. We need research that will place a new focus on child interests 
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and that can provide a meaningful guide to policymakers interested 
in doing the right thing for children.  
 Without this kind of fundamental change in the field’s research 
dynamics, we can predict that even if the DR reform movement is 
derailed, another similar movement will take its place and will enjoy 
years of success based largely on the same kind of self-serving re-
search that has historically played such a harmful role. 
CONCLUSION 
 DR represents a dangerous direction for children. But it is a famil-
iar, dangerous direction. The dynamics that have produced this latest 
fad are the same dynamics that brought us the IFPS and Racial Dis-
proportionality movements.  
 There is some indication now that this latest fad may be fading. 
One recent report lists nine states as having decided to eliminate or 
not expand their DR programs.362  
 Florida, one of the first states to adopt DR, dropped it after some 
five years of experience.363 Illinois recently dropped its DR program 
close to the end of the QIC-DR research study.364 The Illinois CPS 
Department justified this decision to the legislature based on con-
cerns that DR had caused safety problems by diverting staff from the 
traditional CPS system, and it noted that the soon-to-be-released 
QIC-DR Report found children on the AR track more likely to experi-
ence maltreatment recurrence than children on the TR track.365 Mich-
igan concluded that DR research provided insufficient support for the 
program and thus decided in 2013, and again in 2014, not to imple-
ment DR.366 In Los Angeles, a report by the County Counsel’s Chil-
                                                                                                                                       
 362. Piper, supra note 55, at 100. The Casey Family Programs Implementation Kit lists 
six states as having discontinued, with four of these in the planning stages of reinstating. 
GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 6. The 2014 IOM Report mentions Arizona, Arkansas, 
and West Virginia as among those dropping their DR programs. IOM/NRC 2014 REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 199. 
 363. FLA. COMM. ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, & ELDER AFFAIRS, DIFFERENTIAL 
RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, S. 2011-105, at 3-4 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.flsenate.gov/UserContent/Session/2011/Publications/InterimReports/ 
pdf/2011-105cf.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D49U-DTQM (discussing 1998 legislation 
eliminating DR).  
 364. See FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 93.  
 365. Letter from Denise Gonzales, Acting Director, Ill. Dep’t. of Children & Family 
Servs., to Sens. Mattie Hunter and Julie Morrison (Dec. 18, 2013) (on file with author). 
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dren’s Special Investigative Unit in 2012, triggered by a rash of child 
deaths, found that “under-informed investigations and an over-
reliance on L.A.’s differential response experiment . . . contributed to 
the majority of the deaths.”367 Los Angeles eliminated its DR program 
in 2012 based on these and related concerns that the program’s di-
version of funds and staff from the traditional CPS system put chil-
dren at undue risk.368 Minnesota, one of the early DR states, recently 
formed a taskforce to assess the dangers to children posed by the 
state’s child welfare system, including its emphasis on DR and the 
related assignment of a large percentage of reported cases to the AR 
track.369 
 DR may be increasingly discredited and even derailed in the com-
ing years. But we can expect DR to be followed by another similar 
movement. Radical change in the dynamics of the child welfare field 
and in our thinking about children’s rights is a prerequisite for any 
true reform.  
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gram); see also Memorandum from Stacie Bladen, Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., to Steve 
Yager, Deputy Director, Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., Children’s Servs. Administration 
(Mar. 31, 2014) (on file with author) (recommending against DR implementation in Michi-
gan based on the priority that Michigan places on child safety, review of the research, and 
concern that DR’s absence of investigation puts children at risk). 
 367. Heimpel, supra note 7. 
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 369. See, e.g., Brandon Stahl, Task Force Assails Child Protection for Meager Follow-up, 
STAR TRIBUNE (Oct. 14, 2014, 6:17 AM), www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=279047731, 
archived at http://perma.cc/TK6N-UUZT.  
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